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I. INTRODUCTION: THE PLACE OF EXPECTATION AND RELIANCE IN
CONTRACTUAL DECISION MAKING
A. Two Contractual Decisions in Need of Moral Assessment
Expectation and reliance are concepts that continue to vie for priority
as core organizing principles of contract law. The expectation and
reliance interests appear to differ from each other both in how they
conceptualize the essential wrong alleged in contract litigation and in
how they would propose to remedy that wrong. Expectation views the
wrong as the breaking of a promise, and seeks to remedy that wrong by
awarding specific or substitutionary relief that will give the promisee the
benefit of that promise.' Reliance views the wrong as the making of a
promise that induced the promisee to change her position to her
detriment, and seeks to remedy that wrong by restoring the plaintiff to
the position she would have occupied had the defendant not made her
promise.
1. W. David Slawson, The Role of Reliance in Contract Damages, 76 CORNELL
L. REv. 197, 217 (1990) ("The wrong in a contract case is the failure to perform the
promise.... Thus, the expectation measure is the compensation principle applied to
contracts." (emphasis in original)).
2. Warren A. Seavey, Reliance upon Gratuitous Promises or Other Conduct, 64
HARV. L. REv. 913, 926 (1950-1951) ("The wrong [in promissory estoppel] is not
primarily in depriving the plaintiff of the promised reward but in causing the plaintiff to
change position to his detriment.").
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The question of expectation versus reliance is of considerable
theoretical and practical importance. Rightly or wrongly, the reliance
interest has come to be associated theoretically with the "death of
contract" thesis, or the idea that promissory liability belongs in tort law
alongside other forms of misrepresentation.! And numerous practical
consequences turn on the issue. Should reliance damages be a
supplement or even a replacement for expectation damages for breach of
contract? Should promises that are lacking in consideration or some
other formal element (such as a writing) be enforceable if they induce
detrimental reliance? And if so, should the remedy for such promissory
estoppel be measured by the plaintiff s expectation or reliance interest?
The scholarly literature on expectation versus reliance is vast and
daunting, and much of that literature is of a remarkably high quality.7 It
is striking how little consensus there seems to be on the subject, with
aggressive champions for expectation and reliance continuing to press
their cases. In one sense it is almost surely true that there is nothing
completely new under the sun when it comes to comparing the
expectation and reliance interests. The position defended in this Article
is one that has been seen dimly or hinted at in numerous previous
writings on the subject, ironically by advocates of both expectation and
reliance. But it has never been stated clearly as the fundamental
theoretical answer to the expectation versus reliance dilemma.
3. GRANT GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT 73-74 (1974) (noting that reliance
and restitution are usurping the role of consideration through promissory estoppel and
quasi-contract).
4. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFCoNmACTS § 349 (1981).
As an alternative to the measure of damages stated in § 347, the injured party
has a right to damages based on his reliance interest, including expenditures
made in preparation for performance or in performance, less any loss that the
party in breach can prove With reasonable certainty the injured party would
have suffered had the contract been performed.
Id.
5. Id. § 90 (discussing promissory estoppel); id. § 139 (stating that reliance can
overcome "the Statute of Frauds if injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of the
promise").
6. Id. § 90(1) ('The remedy granted for breach may be limited as justice
requires."). This language was added in the Restatement (Second) as a result of
commentary to the effect that Williston was wrong in believing that a promise enforced
under section 90 must be enforceable to the full extent of the promised expectation.
Charles L. Knapp, Reliance in the Revised Restatement: The Proliferation of Promissory
Estoppel, 81 COLuM. L. REv. 52, 55 (1981) (discussing this history).
7. A number of these articles are discussed in Part Mit of this Article. See infra
notes 142-281 and accompanying text.
The thesis of this Article is that there are two separate and distinct
wrongs implicated in breach of contract actions. The two wrongs both
stem from a common premise: a promise purports to place the promisor
under an obligation to keep the promise. When there are no excusing
conditions, it will succeed in making the promisor obligated, so that the
breaking of the promise is indeed a wrong, calling for an expectation-
based response. However, in some cases the promise will not succeed in
placing the promisor under an obligation, especially if an analysis of the
promisor's circumstances shows that the promise is unexpectedly and
unreasonably harsh on the promisor. Nevertheless, the promisor may be
at fault for leading the promisee to believe incorrectly that the promisor
has successfully placed herself under an obligation to perform. A
reliance-based response is appropriate for undoing the harm caused to
the promisee by the promisor's behavior. Even when full performance
could have been excused, however, it will be argued that expectation
remains the appropriate response to unreasonable or inefficient behavior
already performed under the contract prior to seeking its avoidance.
An important starting point for our analysis is to focus upon contract
nonperformance as involving at least two decisions by the promisor. A
party decides whether to enter into the contract, and if she does so, she
later decides whether or not to perform. Complexities could, of course,
be added to this account. A contract might become literally impossible
to perform, so that no second choice was ever in fact made. Also, there
are additional choices made after contracting that influence the
likelihood of nonperformance which might be called precautionary
choices.8 For example, a party could decide to assign one of its more (or
less) reliable employees to a particular project. In the end it will be
argued that precautionary decisions should be assimilated to the
performance-or-breach decision on the ground that they are choices that
can lead to nonperformance.9 But let us focus for now upon the simple
model in which one decision is made to enter the contract and a second
decision is later made to perform or breach that contract.
There is an apparent link between these two decisions and the
expectation/reliance dichotomy of contract theory. The reliance interest
seeks to place the promisee in the position she would have occupied if
the promisor had not made the first choice to enter the contract. The
expectation interest seeks to place the promisee in the position she
8. Robert Cooter & Melvin Aron Eisenberg, Damages for Breach of Contract, 73
CAL. L. REv. 1434, 1464 (1985) (discussing the effect of expectation damages on
amount of precaution taken against inadvertent breach of contract).
9. See infra notes 93-94 and accompanying text.
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would have occupied if the promisor had not made the second choice to
breach the contract. Another way of putting this is that reliance is a
natural idea to consider in response to wrongs committed by the
promisor in making the initial choice to enter the contract, while
expectation is a plausible response to wrongs committed in making the
second choice to breach the contract.
Many commentators supportive of expectation as an organizing
principle of contract law have stressed the greater plausibility of their
account of the underlying wrong."0 Intuitively, it is wrong to break a
promise that one has made. It does not obviously seem wrong to make a
promise in the first place. In many cases the promise itself was
eminently sensible and appropriate, but was simply broken
opportunistically by the promisor. Even when the promise is imprudent,
or even if it is made in bad faith, it causes no harm to the promisee as
long as it is performed. Thus, at least in the case where it is possible to
perform, the wrong seems naturally concentrated in the second decision.
On the other hand, the fact that a promise can be impossible to
perform shows that this cannot be a complete account. Suppose that one
promises to do something which, unbeknownst to the promisee, one
cannot possibly do. There is no second action that can be meaningfully
criticized. But the first action seems objectionable, especially if the
promisee reasonably relied to her detriment on her belief that the
performance would indeed be possible. That is particularly clear in
cases where the promisor knew she would be unable to perform, a
behavior sometimes called promissory fraud." But the promisor could
also be criticized if she knew or should have known circumstances that
could create a significant chance that she would be unable to perform,
but chose to make an unqualified promise anyway on which the
promisee relied.
The impossibility case is not, however, the only situation in which the
first decision is the one to criticize. The point of the impossibility case
is captured by the common philosophical observation that "ought
10. E.g., Michael B. Kelly, The Phantom Reliance Interest in Contract Damages,
1992 Wis. L. REV. 1755, 1802; Slawson, supra note 1, at 217-19.
11. See Paul T. Wangerin, Damages for Reliance Across the Spectrum of Law:. Of
Blind Men and Legal Elephants, 72 IOWA L. REv. 47, 58-61 (1986) (discussing
promissory misrepresentation theory as spelled out in RESTATEMNT (SECO.D) OF ToRTS
§ 530(1) (1965) and applied in Ellis v. Zuck, 409 F. Supp. 1151 (N.D. Ala. 1976), aft'd,
546 F.2d 643 (5th Cir. 1977)).
implies can."' 2 If it was physically impossible to perform, then there is
no second decision or human action that can be justly criticized. There
may, however, be situations in which one is not under a moral duty to
keep a particular promise, even though it would be physically possible to
do so. The duty to keep promises is presumably not absolute, and one
can imagine situations in which new information has come to light that
shows the original decision to contract was a tragic mistake that would
be unconscionable to enforce. 3 Law and morals might then work to
excuse the contractual duty.'
Even though the second decision to breach has been excused by virtue
of the totality of the circumstances, there remains a question of
accountability for the first decision to enter into the contract. At least if
the promisor knew or should have known of her own personal
circumstances that could ultimately render the contract unconscionably
harsh, she can be faulted for entering into an unconditional promise to
perform. By making an unconditional promise that failed to put the
promisee on notice of the prospect of regret contingencies, the promisor
may have induced the promisee to rely to her detriment. The fact that
the promisor cannot be criticized for failing to perform the contract, and
cannot be made to suffer the actual enforcement of that contract, does
not mean that she escapes criticism for entering the contract in the first
place or accountability for the promisee's reliance.
A simple example of this form of reasoning can be drawn from the
political world. As a candidate, the elder George Bush urged the
electorate to "read my lips" and promised there would be "no new
taxes."'5 President Bush then agreed to raise taxes, and this breach of
faith with the electorate became a political issue for candidate Bill
Clinton. During the Presidential debate, Clinton was asked how Bush
could be criticized for breaking his promise, given that taxes needed to
be raised to close the growing deficit. Clinton responded that Bush's
wrong was in making the "no new taxes" pledge in the first place. 6
12. R.M. HARE, FREEDOM AND REASON 51 (1963) (discussing this Kantian
dictum).
13. Morris R. Cohen, The Basis of Contract, 46 HARV. L. REv. 553, 573 (1933)
("Many of us indeed would shudder at the idea of being bound by every promise, no
matter how foolish, without any chance of letting increased wisdom undo past
foolishness.").
14. For an argument that the existing system of remedies for breach of contract
does indeed seek to incorporate some forgiveness of promises in the face of regret, see
Louis E. Wolcher, The Accommodation of Regret in Contract Remedies, 73 IOWA L.
REv. 797, 798 (1988).
15. Stephen D. Sencer, Read My Lips: Examining the Legal Implications of
Knowingly False Campaign Promises, 90 MICH. L. REv. 428, 428 (1991) (discussing
implications of Bush's 1988 statement).
16. Election '92: In Their Own Words: Excerpts from Presidential Debate,
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The reliance advocate can add that it is not so obvious that breaking a
promise is always a wrong. Why is it wrong to make a promise and then
immediately retract it, before the promisee has had a chance to change
her position in reliance on the initial promise?'7 And if there is no wrong
in the absence of reliance, is it not clear that the wrong from breaching a
promise is really measured by the reliance placed on the promise? After
all, it would be anomalous to say that a promise to pay $1 million is not
at all wrong if no one relies on it before it is retracted, but becomes a
grievous, $1 million wrong if someone spends $5 in reliance. It would
be more natural to say that one has gone from no wrong to a very small
wrong.
The point can be turned into an affirmative virtue for the reliance over
the expectation interest. As Mark Pettit, Jr. has stressed, a crucial
difference between the expectation and the reliance interest is that the
former involves the state in enforcing the surplus that a promisee has
extracted from a promisor who has contracted in error."5 After all, in
many cases the plaintiff would have contracted with someone else if the
defendant had not made her promise, so the plaintiff suffers little
damage except in the case where the defendant made a serious error that
the rest of the market would not have made.'9 Reliance is appropriately
forgiving of the defendant's error, while expectation cruelly holds the
defendant to a mistaken promise even if no one has relied on it.
The scenario Pettit considers is one in which the promisor has come to
regret her initial decision to enter the contract. Commentators
sometimes speak as if this were the case for all breaches of contract,:g
but it is not. There can be many different reasons why a party would
ATLAmTA CoNsT., Oct. 20, 1992, at A17.
17. P.S. Atiyah, Contracts, Promises and the Law of Obligations, 94 LQ. REV.
193, 211-12 (1978) (questioning the moral case for enforcing wholly executory
contracts).
18. Mark Pettit, Jr., Private Advantage and Public Power: Reexamining the
Expectation and Reliance Interests in Contract Damages, 38 HATGS U. 417, 418
(1987) (stating that expectation improperly enforces extra advantage from contracting
with specific party rather than market).
19. Id. at 420-22 (discussing lost opportunities as form of reliance).
20. E.g., Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, Enforcing Promises: An Examination
of the Basis of Contract, 89 YALE L.J. 1261, 1273 (1980) ("The term 'regret
contingency' will be used to denote the future occurrence of a condition that would
motivate breach if breach were a costless option for the promisor."). Goetz and Scott do,
however, acknowledge the existence of a category of promises rendered in bad faith that
might be stretched to include all opportunistic motives for breach. Id.
rationally choose to enter into a contract and then rationally choose to
breach that same contract. The next section will explore those reasons.
Since the reliance versus expectation debate is largely a matter
of keeping straight the two decisions involved in contractual
nonperformance cases, it is logical that one would want to look quite
carefully at the reasons that caused the promisor to make two apparently
inconsistent decisions. That project is undertaken in the next section.
After that discussion of motives, we will have the necessary tools for
Part II of this Article, which sets forth the moral and economic case for
expectation and reliance and a suggestion for how those cases can be
reconciled. Part II of the Article will then seek to situate this normative
argument within the existing literature on expectation and reliance.
B. Six Motives for Making and Then Breaking a Particular Contract
Why might a rational person voluntarily enter into a contract and then
subsequently voluntarily breach that same contract? For purposes of the
reliance/expectation discussion, it is productive to distinguish among six
different reasons for this apparent change in the promisor's behavior.
1. Taking Advantage of Nonsimultaneous Performances
Jack and Jill are trading baseball cards. Jack has two Sammy Sosas
and Jill has two Mark McGwires. They agree that Jack will trade a Sosa
card for a McGwire card, a trade they both intend to carry out at the time
they make their promises. Jack gives his Sosa card to Jill, but a friend
then tells Jill that Jack is very weak and will not do anything if people do
something wrong to him. So Jill decides to keep both cards and refuses
to have further contact with Jack.
In this case, there was nothing wrong with the making of the promise.
It was a sensible trade undertaken in good faith at the time. The wrong
seems clearly to be in the breaking of the promise.2' This would suggest
the appropriateness of awarding Jack his expectation interest. Indeed, in
this case it would seem that specific performance would be the ideal
remedy, as this would give Jack precisely what he bargained for and
expected rather than a court's guess about what sum of money would
make him indifferent to receiving the cherished McGwire card.
A reliance advocate might say that the wrong is only the harm
suffered by Jack in losing his Sosa card in reliance (and, one might add,
the unjust enrichment of Jill by retaining the Sosa card). Therefore, the
21. RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 102-03 (5th ed. 1998)
(noting that opportunistic breach of contract seeks to exploit sequential character of
performance).
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wrong could be undone by making Jill return the Sosa card to Jack. But
this seems an odd way of looking at the issue. After being promised the
McGwire card, why should Jack have to settle for the return of the Sosa
card? Indeed, it seems misguided to return the Sosa card, which makes
both Jack and Jill worse off than they would be if the promise were
fulfilled. It is true that they could now try the exchange again, but Jack
might be understandably wary of Jill at this point, or Jill might now
refuse to trade out of anger at having been called to account on the first
transaction. If the right thing is for the promise to be kept, it seems
counterintuitive to unwind the transaction instead and hope that the
promise will be made and kept the second time.
One might ask why parties would structure their transaction to involve
nonsimultaneous performances despite the risk of opportunistic breach
of contract. There could be many reasons. Cash flow problems may
dictate particular timing for payments obligations. There may be
technological efficiencies from rendering services at particular speeds.
It may also be hard to come up with a precise money equivalent for each
stage of performance. And the parties may prefer to avoid the uncertain
tug-of-war of simultaneous tender in favor of allowing the party to go
second who seems to have the greater reputational stake in performing,
or who can be sued more easily for nonperformance. Of course, parties
frequently try to use progress payments and other devices to limit their
vulnerability to breaches of this character.
In the McGwire/Sosa hypothetical, the reliance remedy might
indirectly serve to promote the expectation interest. If Jill realizes that
the profit has been taken out of her opportunistic strategy, perhaps she
will conclude that she might as well perform on the contract. However,
suppose that this trade was only part of an overall contract between Jack
and Jill that also involved services such as expert advice about the cards
that should be traded. Now the reliance interest, which seeks to restore
Jack to the position he was in before the contract was entered, seems
strikingly perverse. If Jack has received benefits under the contract, Jill
now has a certain leeway to commit opportunistic breaches with no
sanction at all, until the loss from those breaches begins to exceed the
benefits Jack has received under the contract. The reliance interest
simply is not suited to a case where the original promise is
unobjectionable but the promise is being breached opportunistically
because of nonsimultaneous performances.
2. Making a Threat to Breach in the Face of
Situational Monopoly Credible
A second common pattern in which a party would voluntarily choose
to enter a contract and then breach it concerns the situational monopoly
arising from reliance. At the time of contracting, there might be many
parties who could do a particular job, but once the defendant promises to
do it, other parties are likely to go away and be unavailable on short
notice. The plaintiff may also make relationship-specific investments,
such as advertising that a particular singer will be appearing on a given
night, which would be wasted if the defendant did not perform."
Interestingly, the plaintiffs reliance does not directly motivate the
defendant to breach a contract. The contract is still profitable to the
defendant, so she will still lose from walking away from the project.
Nevertheless, it is in the defendant's interest to threaten to breach as a
way of extorting additional consideration from the plaintiff through one-
sided contractual modifications.
There are doctrines designed to deal with the problem of improperly
exacted modifications of the contract. For example, there is the common
law preexisting duty rule, which would say that one-sided modifications
are lacking in consideration and therefore unenforceable.' This
doctrine, however, is readily circumvented by adding some small
additional duties, and in any event no longer applies to goods contracts.2
There are other doctrines for policing modifications, such as the
doctrines of good faith' and economic duress.26 These doctrines have
rather vague contours, however, and in any event it may not be terribly
realistic for the relying promisee to litigate the issue. Thus, the
22. Reliance expenditures create a problem of "asset specificity," or assets that are
more valuable when attached to a particular relationship than otherwise. The work of
Jim Leitzel is particularly useful here. Jim Leitzel, Reliance and Contract Breach, 52
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 87, 89, 101 (1989); see generally Jim Leitzel, The New
Institutional Economics and a Model of Contract, 11 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 75 (1989)
(discussing a model of contract including concepts such as asset specificity).
23. See, e.g., Stilk v. Myrick, 170 Eng. Rep. 1168 (1809) (holding one-sided
modification of seaman's contract negotiated on high seas unenforceable for lack of
consideration); Alaska Packers' Ass'n v. Domenico, 117 F. 99, 100-01, 105 (1902)
(holding same as Stilk with similar facts).
24. See U.C.C. § 2-209(1) (1989) ("An agreement modifying a contract within this
Article needs no consideration to be binding.").
25. See id. § 1-203 ("Every contract or duty within this Act imposes an obligation
of good faith in its performance or enforcement."). Comment 2 of U.C.C. § 2-209
provides that while consideration is no longer required for modifications, "modifications
made thereunder must meet the test of good faith imposed by this Act." Id. § 2-209 cmt.
2.
26. E.g., Austin Instrument, Inc. v. Loral Corp., 272 N.E.2d 533, 534, 537 (1971)
(holding modification of Navy subcontract made under threat not to deliver unless price
increased void for economic duress).
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promisor's threat to breach the contract in the face of reliance is a
genuine worry, and if her bluff to breach the contract is called, she may
be forced to breach at least for a time to make her threat to extort
modifications credible.
Again, when this motive is implicated, there is nothing wrong with the
initial promise. In fact, the prospect of detrimental reliance is very likely
the reason the parties chose to enter into a binding contract in the first
place. The moral answer seems clear: the original promise should be
kept. Expectation-based remedies send this message most clearly,
especially if the plaintiff can go to court immediately and get an
injunction ordering the defendant to perform on the original contract.
As in the first case, it might be thought that reliance would indirectly
achieve the same objective. If the plaintiff can force the defendant to
restore the status quo ante, before she relied on the promise, she has
removed much of the defendant's leverage to extort a modification.
However, there is no apparent reason to send such an indirect message
when what clearly needs to be done is for the promise to be kept.
And, again, if the contract has been going on for some time, the
plaintiff may have derived appreciable benefits from the transaction.
The reliance interest viil not start to award the plaintiff anything until
the harm from the breach is greater than the benefits she has already
received under the contract. This gives the defendant a good deal of
leverage to use the plaintiff's vulnerability to a breach to effect a
modification. Thus the reliance interest only promotes by indirection the
proper goal of contract enforcement in the case where the plaintiff has
received no benefits under the transaction at all. In short, where the
proper moral action is for the promise to be kept, the reliable moral
response is vindication of the expectation interest.
3. Refusing to Carry Through on an Agreed-upon Allocation of Risk
The reliance interest can be made to look somewhat silly by
hypotheticals raising the question of risk. Suppose that the plaintiff
purchases a fire insurance policy and pays the premium regularly for a
period of time. When a fire occurs, the insurer, now under a new and
more corrupt management, refuses to pay for the plaintiff's fire damage
but does offer to return the plaintiff's premiums with interest. The
wrong again appears not to be the making of the promise, which was
undertaken rationally and in good faith. The problem is rather that the
promise has been broken, and the restoration of the status quo ante
seems a preposterous answer to the wrong.'
A reliance advocate might respond that this analysis misstates the
plaintiffs reliance interest. If the insured had not contracted with this
particular insurance company, it is likely that she would have contracted
with another, who probably would have performed on the promise.28 So
her reliance interest is the amount the other insurer would have paid, not
the return of premiums plus interest.
This response seems inadequate in a number of respects. For one
thing, what about the case where the foregone transaction hypothesis is
not in fact true? Suppose that the plaintiff is a busy and inattentive
person who would normally not have procured fire insurance, but the
defendant managed to catch the plaintiff at home with a telephone
solicitation for insurance. Is it now acceptable for the insurance
company to respond with the return of premiums plus interest?
Another problem with the "foregone opportunity" response is that it
assumes the other insurer would have performed.29 That is probably true
given a moral and legal climate in which promisors are sanctioned for
breaking their promises. But if the norm became that the only wrong
from breaking a promise was in the promisee's reliance, it becomes less
clear that the other insurance company would have performed. Would
the other insurer have faced damages for breach beyond the return of
premiums plus interest? The argument would have to be that if the
defendant had not made its promise, another insurer would have, and if
that other insurer had not made its promise, a third insurer would have,
and so on ad infinitum. But the market does not have an infinite number
of insurers, and the plaintiff may not have known how to contact some
of the insurers that actually exist, so when one reaches some party, say
the 50th insurer, that party would not really have preempted the plaintiff
from pursuing the 51st. So the 50th insurer would have had no legal
(and perhaps no moral) incentive to perform, in which case the 49th
insurer has not deprived the plaintiff of anything valuable in preempting
the 50th. So the 49th would face no damages beyond the return of
premiums plus interest, and through similar reasoning no insurers are
liable for damages beyond the return of premiums plus interest.
The foregone opportunity argument is really parasitic upon the idea
that the preempted insurance company would have felt the duty to keep
27. The anomaly of applying reliance damages to insurance contracts is discussed
in Kelly, supra note 10, at 1774-76.
28. See Pettit, supra note 18, at 422 (stating that reliance also allocates risks by
virtue of its recognition of foregone opportunities).
29. Slawson, supra note 1, at 220 ("The profits on each such lost opportunity must
be discounted by the probability that the promises concerned would not have been
kept.").
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its promise. Thus, it depends on the idea of a moral and/or legal duty to
keep promises. If one is going to invoke such a moral or legal duty at
the second stage, one might as well invoke it at the first stage and say
that the first insurer's problem is in not keeping its promise, rather than
in diverting an insured away from some insurer that would have kept its
promise.
A critically important question is how broad the range of rational risk
allocation is. Advocates of the reliance interest have typically
downplayed this motive for the breaching of contracts, suggesting that it
fits only a few cases such as insurance or wagering.' On the other hand,
advocates of expectation have argued that most contracts contain an
insurance feature,3 in that fixed-price arrangements allocate the risk of
price changes in the way the parties prefer, thereby taking account of the
relative risk aversion of the parties, their access to methods of
diversifying away particular risks with futures markets, and the like."
This Article is not the place to decide precisely how broadly to read
the risk-allocation function of contracts. However, it may be helpful to
set forth three ideal types and to express a preference among the three.
The narrowest reading would presumably be that the parties placed the
risk of only those contingencies which they specifically foresaw and
consciously chose not to exempt from the general language of the
contract. The broadest reading would be that of Paradine v. Jane," that
the parties, by choosing unconditional language, have placed the risk of
every contingency that they could have excluded from that language but
did not.34
30. Atiyah, supra note 17, at 217 ("It is very far from being true that all contracts,
even all executory contracts, are exercises in risk allocation. Frequently, it is the
interpretation of the law which converts a simple postponed exchange into a risk-
allocation exercise, rather than any deliberate intent of the parties."). As to wagering,
Atiyah sees no social utility in furthering that particular risk-allocation. Id.
31. Kelly, supra note 10, at 1776 ("The problem is not unique to insurance
contracts. To some extent, every contract contains an aspect of insurance."). For
example, Kelly argues that warranties constitute insurance against the effects of product
failure. Id.
32. The factors entering into the decision on how risks rationally ought to be
allocated by contract are discussed in Richard A. Posner & Andrew N1. Rosenfield.
Impossibility and Related Doctrines in Contract Law: An Economic Analysis, 6 J. LEGAL
STUD. 83, 83 (1977).
33. 82 Eng. Rep. 897, 898 (K.B. 1647) (holding lease not excused by invasion of
Prince Rupert).
34. Id. at 897 ("[B]ut when the party by his own contract creates a duty or charge
upon himself, he is bound to make it good, if he may, notwithstanding any accident by
inevitable necessity, because he might have provided against it by his contract.").
The first description is too narrow. One of the purposes of contracting
is to set clear rules of title that will handle at a minimum of cost and
uncertainty not only the specifically foreseen but also the unforeseen
contingencies that may arise, provided that the effect of applying the
clear language to the unforeseen contingency is not too horrible. On the
other hand, the latter description is too broad. The transaction costs of
thinking about and providing for every remote contingency that could
occur are too large to draw a confident inference that unconditional
language always constitutes a deliberate placement of risk. Thus, one is
led by default to an intermediate third alternative, that unconditional
language constitutes an allocation of the risk of some but not all
unforeseen contingencies.
Of course, this alternative is quite vague and leaves plenty of room for
differences of view. The important point is that rational risk allocation
and expectation fit together logically in a way that rational risk
allocation and reliance do not. Thus, if one adopts a broad view of the
scope of risk allocated by a contract, one will be led to favor a relatively
greater scope for the expectation over the reliance interest. A narrower
view of risk allocation will tend to be more compatible with a relatively
broad use of the reliance interest as an organizing principle of contract
law.
4. Seeking to Appropriate Information Productively Brought
to Bear on the Transaction by the Promisee
Before proceeding with a description of the fourth motive for breach,
it may be helpful to think about a method of categorizing the reasons we
have considered so far. That categorization method looks at the role of
new information and regret that each motive envisions. In Motive 1
involving nonsimultaneous performances, there was no new information
about the costs and benefits of the transaction between the time of
contracting and the time of performance. It was expected all along that
performances would be nonsimultaneous and that this would offer a
temptation to the second party in time; that was what motivated the
parties to contract in the first place. If there was any new information at
all, it was the information that the first party in time was less likely to
sue than originally anticipated.
Similarly, in Motive 2 new information plays little or no role. The
parties may very well have known from the beginning that the plaintiff
would become reliant on the particular defendant, and this fear of
situational monopoly is why they entered the contract in the first place.
New information is possible; perhaps the parties at the time of
contracting underestimated the likely dependence that the plaintiff would
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experience. But the core of this motivation for the defendant's threat to
breach is the fact of plaintiff's dependency, not the availability of new
information reinforcing that fact.
In Motive 3 there was "new" information, which was the fact that the
house did indeed catch on fire. On the other hand, in a broader sense
this information was not really new, but simply the unfolding of the
precise scenario for data acquisition that the parties knew all along
would arise. If the insurance company acted rationally in the face of the
data available to it, data which lead to predictable probabilities of future
outcomes, it should have no reason to regret its initial choice to insure
the property merely because the fire actually occurred. Nor does a Las
Vegas casino have reason to feel regret about a particular patron's
having come to the casino merely because she happened to win at
roulette.
The important function of reliance is to redress the wrong of making a
promise that the other party is reasonably led to believe is binding but in
fact is not. A promissory duty is most likely to be considered excused in
a case where the promise has proven to be much more burdensome than
anticipated by virtue of some revealed mistake or change in
circumstances. Genuinely new information, leading to surprise and
regret, is involved in legal doctrines such as mistake," impracticability,'6
and procedural unconscionability.3 Thus it is no coincidence that
reliance does such a poor job of handling the first three categories of
cases, where truly new information, surprise, and regret do not play a
central role.
35. RESTATEMENT, supra note 4, § 153.
Where a mistake of one party at the time a contract was made as to a basic
assumption on which he made the contract has a material effect on the agreed
exchange of performances that is adverse to him, the contract is voidable by
him if he does not bear the risk of the mistake... and (a) the effect of the
mistake is such that enforcement of the contract would be unconscionable ....
Id. Section 153(b) of the Restatement (Second) would also excuse performance where
"the other party had reason to know of the mistake or his fault caused the mistake," but
this would not be a good situation for awarding the other party her reliance damages. Id
§ 153(b).
36. U.C.C. § 2-615(a) (1989) (nonperformance excused when performance was
made impracticable "by the occurrence of a contingency the non-occurrence of which
was a basic assumption on which the contract was made").
37. Id. § 2-302 (contract or term can be invalidated if the court finds "the contract
or any clause of the contract to have been unconscionable at the time it was made"). An
early statement of the distinction between procedural and substantive unconscionability
is Arthur Allen Leff, Unconscionability and the Code-The Emperor's New Clause, 115
U. PA. L. REv. 485,486-87 (1967).
In the remaining three cases new information will play an important
role. It is tempting to say that reliance should be considered a plausible
remedy for all such cases, but that is incorrect. Motive 4 involves the
productive use of new information by the promisee, which causes the
promisor, once she learns of that information, to regret her choice. It
is the case that was initially brought to our attention by Anthony
Kronman in his discussion of nondisclosure." And it is a case where
the defendant's breach is opportunistic and the remedy should be
expectation.
Suppose, for example, that defendant is in possession of farmland that
she erroneously believes has no prospect for oil. Having done satellite
surveys, plaintiff knows the land is in an area highly likely to contain oil.
Plaintiff purchases the land at a price that is high for farmland but low
for oil-bearing land. Plaintiff then moves onto the land, starts drilling,
and strikes oil. The defendant seeks to rescind the contract, offering to
compensate the plaintiff for such reliance expenses as the costs of the
drilling already completed.
This is a Kaldor-Hicks efficient transaction, as there are net gains in
societal wealth brought about by the merger of the information and the
resource.39 It is also, insofar as the parties themselves are concerned, a
Pareto-efficient transaction.' The defendant received more than the land
was worth without the information, and the plaintiff paid less than the
land was worth with the information.
Or consider a typical middleman transaction. Plaintiff is aware of
many buyers for a certain class of rare, used widget in foreign countries.
Defendant is the owner of such a widget but has no idea that the widget
is worth a great deal of money in foreign countries. Plaintiff pays the
defendant a price that is more attractive than that offered by any market
of which the defendant was aware, but less attractive than that offered by
markets of which the plaintiff is aware. Again, the plaintiffs
middleman enterprise is economically valuable, moving the resource to a
higher use.4' And, at least if one assumes the defendant was never going
38. Anthony T. Kronman, Mistake, Disclosure, Information, and the Law of
Contracts, 7 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1978).
39. Christopher T. Wonnell, The Structure of a General Theory of Nondisclosure,
41 CASE WES. RES. L. REv. 329, 340-44 (1991) (arguing that merger of information and
resource distinguishes buyer from seller nondisclosure).
40. It must be remembered that transactions are rarely Pareto efficient when the
interests of all nonparties are considered. Competitors of the parties, for example, would
like nothing better than to have inefficient rules disrupt the prospects for mutually
beneficial trade of their rivals.
41. The economic utility of middleman enterprises is frequently missed, and the
middleman himself correspondingly vilified, by virtue of the common "physical fallacy"
of assuming that a particular good must have the same value by virtue of its physical
characteristics, when in fact its value varies with information, time, and space. THOMAS
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to discover the existence of the foreign market on her own, the
transaction is Pareto efficient for the parties involved as well.
Expectation damages (or specific performance, which also promotes
expectation) would award the plaintiff the profit of her efficient
enterprise. The reliance interest would not.
In Motives 5 and 6, we will see some instances where the plaintiff
exploits the defendant's mistake to redistribute wealth to itself.f In
those cases, it will be argued the reliance interest may be a sensible
organizing principle. What is the difference between the productive uses
of information considered here and the cases where the plaintiff is
simply exploiting the defendant's mistake for redistributive purposes?
This is a difficult question, and only some suggestive answers can be
offered here.
As a first cut, one would like to stress the importance of the question
of whether the defendant would have come into the knowledge on her
own very soon if the plaintiff had not intervened."3 If everybody in town
will know by tomorrow morning that the railroad is coming to town,
there is no real efficiency benefit from rushing out today and buying up
everybody's farmland. After all, there was very little time for the
farmers to make erroneous land use decisions based upon their
misperception that the railroad would never be coming through town.
The analysis is then dominated by Hirshleifer's concern that one not
waste resources in a rush to have the benefits of the inevitable
knowledge redistributed from others to oneself."
Another factor to consider is whether the plaintiff is creating a new
relevant ignorance rather than simply working with an already existing
and relevant ignorance. There may be a certain number of people in the
world who believe that magic beans can produce a beanstalk that will
enable one to climb into the clouds and acquire treasures. This is a
harmless ignorance in most cases, as those people will have little or no
opportunity to take personally imprudent or socially inefficient actions
with this knowledge. However, when the Magic Bean Co. goes door-to-
SOWELL, KNOWLEDGE AND DEcIsIONs 67-72 (1980).
42. See infra, notes 50-64 and accompanying text.
43. Wonnell, supra note 39, at 359 (stressing this point in the context of discussing
Laidlmv v. Organ, 15 U.S. (2 Wheat.) 178 (1817), where the buyer discovered that the
War of 1812 was over and quickly bought tobacco).
44. Jack Hirshleifer, The Private and Social Value of Inforration and the Reward
to Inventive Activity, 61 AM. ECON. REV. 561 (1971) (private value of information
searches exceeds social value when redistributive gains possible by private effort).
door trying to find the few people who hold this false belief and make
sales to them, the previously irrelevant ignorance has been made
relevant. The resources consumed in that enterprise are wasted. They
should not be rewarded with the expectation interest, which would be the
difference between the high price the gullible few would pay for the
beans and the low price the sensible many would pay.
Of course, if the plaintiff is doing something akin to actual fraud, we
presumably would not want to reward the plaintiff with her reliance
damages either.45 However, there may be cases where the plaintiff is not
guilty of conscious fraud. The beans may be a useful product for some
buyers, but may be purchased in this case because the defendant
believed they would grow a beanstalk that could reach the treasure.
Having made a mistake, it may be appropriate for the defendant to be
accountable to the plaintiff for that mistake, by paying plaintiff's
reliance expenses. But it is another thing to allow the plaintiff to profit
from the defendant's mistake by awarding expectation damages.
Another example of a "new ignorance" would be a contract that
contained a complex term. 6 Suppose that defendant buys goods on
credit because she believes the interest rate is only six percent, but in
fact, by virtue of a complex formula of credits, points, and fees, the real
interest rate is nine percent. Again, this may not be fraud; there may be
reasons to structure the transaction in the form of separate fees that
would have persuaded even rational and informed parties to transact.
But if this particular buyer purchased the goods because she believed the
full interest rate was only six percent, the question then becomes
whether the plaintiff should be able to exploit this mistake by recovering
her full expectation damages. It might seem more fair to allow only
reliance damages, and it would also avoid overdeterring mistakes of this
kind through threatened redistribution."
45. George M. Cohen, The Fault Lines in Contract Damages, 80 VA. L. REv.
1225, 1252 (1994).
If the parties make a jointly unprofitable contract not because of negligent
behavior on the part of one or both parties, but because one party intentionally
misleads the other about the value or the cost of performance, then the
argument for reliance damages disappears in contract law, as it does in tort
law.
Id.
46. Christopher T. Wonnell, Contract Law and the Austrian School of Economics,
54 FORDHAM L. REv. 507, 534 (1986).
Ignorance of the external world and ignorance of contract terms, however, are
two very different problems-the former is an inherent problem that any
economic system must try to alleviate while the latter becomes a problem only
when the legal system has chosen to give effect to unseen contract terms.
Id.
47. Here I do not mean to assert that there should definitely be a defense if one
misread a contract. In some cases the assertion may be a cover for opportunistic
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By contrast, the farmer who does not know that there is oil under her
land may be under that ignorance for a very long time, perhaps
indefinitely, and she is likely to make many erroneous decisions about
the land as a result of her ignorance of its characteristics. The plaintiff
is not creating ignorance; it already existed and was already adversely
affecting the use of resources before the plaintiff entered the picture.
That is similarly true of the middleman if one assumes that the defendant
was not likely to acquire knowledge of the foreign market in the
foreseeable future because of the expertise required to access foreign
offers.
This analysis suggests that the key issue is often not defendant's
ignorance, but her rationality in the face of her known ignorance."' I
may sell my ring to my local jeweler, knowing well that I am unaware of
many actual places I could have sold it for more, and that the jeweler
will probably know these places better than I do. If I rationally conclude
that I am permanently ignorant, then I may indeed be entering into a
transaction rationally despite (indeed, because of) the fact that the other
person is better informed than I am. Moreover, I may enter the
transaction rationally despite knowing that there is a certain probability
that I will become better informed in the future, if I reason sensibly that
the likelihood of this is small enough to be outweighed by the prospect
of making a deal which is attractive in the absence of knowledge right
now. However, those risk allocations, like others, would be upset if
every time one came upon the knowledge one could escape the contract
by merely paying reliance damages.
motives, and yet be difficult to disprove. The litigation costs of opening up so many
transactions would also be an important practical constraint. And in many cases
expectation damages will be a closer proxy to reliance than provable expenditures. The
theoretical point remains that from a first-best moral point of view, the responsibility of
the negligent party is more fairly characterized by the reliance than by the expectation
interest
48. The timing factor was stressed in Randy E. Barnett, Rational Bargaining
Theory and Contract: Default Rules, Hypothetical Consent, the Duty to Disclose, and
Fraud, 15 HARv. J.L. & PuB. POL'Y 783,794-803 (1992).
49. See RESTATEhENT, supra note 4, § 154(b) (stating that a party bears risk of
mistake if "he is aware, at the time the contract is made, that he has only limited
knowledge with respect to the facts to which the mistake relates but treats his limited
knowledge as sufficient").
5. Seeking to Avoid the Contract Because of a Mistake That
Makes the Contract More Burdensome to the Promisor
Than Anticipated and Correspondingly
More Profitable to the Promisee
Let us now explore a fifth motive for voluntarily entering into a
contract and then voluntarily breaching that contract. This is a case
where the contract has proven to be more burdensome to the promisor
than she expected, so much more burdensome that it exceeds any
reasonable conclusions about risks consciously borne. The contract may
be more burdensome because the other party's performance has proven
to have less value than anticipated, or because her own performance has
proven to have greater cost than anticipated. The stimulus for this
motive may be a "mistake" in the sense of facts in existence at the time
of contracting of which the promisor was unaware. Or it may be an
unanticipated change in circumstances which occurs after the contract is
entered. Indeed, at some fundamental level there is very little or no
difference between the cases; circumstances presumably change because
of the playing out of the forces and materials that were already in
existence at the time of the contract."
However, in this Motive 5 we are not primarily interested in the
phenomenon of efficient breach. We are talking about a case in which
the transaction has become redistributive, burdensome to the promisor
but correspondingly profitable to the promisee. By contrast, efficient
breach typically involves a case in which a transaction has become more
burdensome to the promisor without a corresponding increase in the
benefit of the transaction to the promisee. The efficient breach case is
considered separately as the sixth motive in the next section.
As a hypothetical, imagine a contract between Dumb and Dumber for
the sale of a shiny rock that Dumb and Dumber both believe is the Hope
Diamond. Dumb believes the rock is the Hope Diamond because that is
what he was told by Shyster who sold the rock to Dumb for $100 before
skipping town. Dumb believes that the Hope Diamond is worth about
$400 while Dumber, who likes shiny rocks with impressive names, is
not sure how much he would pay for a rock that is so famous." Neither
party is aware that the real Hope Diamond would be worth $10,000,000.
50. The similarity of the mistake and changed circumstances cases, in terms of the
economics of expectation and reliance, has been noted in Cohen, supra note 45, at 1257.
51. An interesting question is whether the buyer's damages ought to be affected by
how much he thought the stone was worth. Normally, a party who is deprived of a good
can recover its market value at a minimum, without inquiry into whether the buyer knew
about its market value. U.C.C. § 2-713 (1989) (stating that the buyer can recover
difference between market value and contract price).
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Dumb says to Dumber, "I guarantee that this is the Hope Diamond" and
the parties agree to a contract price of $500, half of the money payable
in advance and the other half due thirty days after delivery. Dumber
pays Dumb $250, the rock is delivered, and Dumber spends $200
building a display case for the rock that otherwise is irregularly shaped
and valueless. Dumber then discovers the rock to be a fake and sues
Dumb for breach of warranty."
How should damages be measured in this case? Expectation damages
are presumably the difference between the $10,000,000 value of the
Hope Diamond and the $250 in unpaid contract price, or $9,999,750."
Reliance damages are the $250 in down payment plus the $200 in the
useless display case, or $450. And as a matter of logic (though not the
American rule) both the expectation and reliance interests should include
the attorneys' fees of being forced to sue to collect what rightfully
belonged to the plaintiff, as well as any incidental damages.
Expectation damages in this case seem wholly cut off from any
reasonable normative moorings. Put simply, making Dumb pay Dumber
$9,999,750 plus attorneys' fees seems absurd. Admittedly, in the case of
deliberate fraud, there is a certain poetic justice in benefit-of-the-bargain
damages of this kind, making the liar live up to the terms of his lie.
Even there it may be more plausible to view expectation damages as a
kind of punitive award, one that should be subject to reasonable
constraints on amount of the kind that normally attend punitive
damages."5 In the actual case, where Dumb acted in good faith, millions
52. Id § 2-313(1)(a) ("Any affirmation of fact or promise made by the seller to the
buyer which relates to the goods and becomes part of the basis of the bargain creates an
express warranty that the goods shall conform to the affirmation or promise.").
53. Section 2-714(2) of the Uniform Commercial Code creates an obstacle to the
achievement of justice in the Dumb/Dumber case by providing that the "measure of
damages for breach of warranty is the difference at the time and place of acceptance
between the value of the goods accepted and the value they would have had if they had
been as warranted, unless special circumstances show proximate damages of a different
amount." Id § 2-714(2).
54. See L.L. Fuller & William R. Perdue, Jr., The Reliance Interest in Contract
Damages: 1, 46 YAM L.J. 52, 61 (1936) (hereinafter Fuller & Perdue 1) ("It is therefore
possible to view the rule measuring damages by the expectancy in a quasi-criminal
aspect, its purpose being not so much to compensate the promisee as to penalize breach
of promise by the promisor.").
55. E.g., Cain v. Fontana, 423 S.W.2d 134 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967). The court
noted:
While the amount of exemplary damages should be reasonably proportional to
the actual damages, no set rule or ratio as between the amount of actual
damages and exemplary damages can be laid down, and such amount must
of dollars of punishment are certainly not warranted.5 6
What has happened in the Dumb/Dumber case to make an expectation
award so unappealing? In making a warranty that the stone was the
Hope Diamond, Dumb did not realize that he was making a multi-
million-dollar commitment to Dumber. Holding Dumb to his mistaken
decision is unconscionably harsh. But Dumb was careless in making the
unconditional warranty, and his carelessness has cost Dumber $450 plus
attorneys' fees. It is fair to hold Dumb accountable for his carelessness
in leading Dumber to believe that he could safely rely to his detriment
on the assurance that he now owned the Hope Diamond.
Actual cases in which expectation appears misplaced are not as
dramatic, but one case that seems to fit the description is Chatlos
Systems, Inc. v. National Cash Register Corp.7 In 1974, at a fairly early
stage in the evolution of computing, Chatlos Systems needed to buy a
computer system. NCR's representative told Chatlos that its system
could provide six accounting functions: accounts receivable, payroll,
order entry, inventory deletion, state income tax, and cash receipts!'
The price was set at $46,020. NCR installed the equipment, but did not
succeed in making it fully operational.' The trial court, applying the
"benefit of the bargain" measure of damages, awarded $201,826.50 to
Chatlos.6 On appeal, this award was upheld on the strength of expert
testimony, which established that only a computer much more powerful
and expensive than NCR's would be capable of performing all six
functions promised. 2
Expectation damages in this case seem overly harsh to NCR. Almost
certainly, it was not aware that it was agreeing to underwrite the expense
of a vastly more sophisticated computer system than the one it was
selling in the event that its own computer system could not be made to
work. Expectation ruthlessly enforces NCR's mistake and awards
depend upon the facts of a particular case. Such amount depends, among other
things, upon the nature of the wrong, the character of the conduct involved, the
degree of culpability of the wrongdoer, the situation and sensibilities of the
parties concerned, and the extent to which such conduct offends a public sense
of justice and propriety.
Id. at 139.
56. The issue of benefit-of-the-bargain versus out-of-pocket damages arises in
misrepresentation law as well. A good discussion appears in Wangerin, supra note 11, at
60-62.
57. 670 F.2d 1304 (3d Cir. 1982).
58. Chatlos Sys., Inc. v. Nat'l Cash Register Corp., 479 F. Supp. 738, 741 (D.N.J.
1979).
59. Id.
60. Id. at 742.
61. Chatlos Sys., Inc., 670 F.2d at 1305.
62. Id. at 1307. The damage award included both consequential damages and
damages based upon the difference in value between the two systems.
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Chatlos a large windfall in the value of a highly powered computer it
probably never considered buying, a windfall that must have surprised
Chatlos as much as it did NCR. Reliance damages, especially if
measured correctly to include attorneys' fees, incidental expenses, and
consequential damages, would appear to be a more just outcome.
It has been argued that expectation theory does not require results such
as those of Chatlos.' The idea is that expectation theory requires only
the enforcement of the actual bargain of the parties, and the bargain
includes both its substantive and its remedial terms.6' If the contract had
expressly limited damages to reliance, enforcing reliance damages
would be giving the benefit of the bargain to the promisee. And if the
parties implicitly would have limited damages to reliance had they
adverted to the possibility of failure, it is consistent with expectation
theory to enforce their implied or gap-filling term.
The problem with this argument is that any remedial scheme can be
made consistent with expectation theory in this way, by saying that
parties would have wanted it. The interesting question is what kind of
substantive and remedial scheme the parties to a contract would want to
govern contractual mistakes that threaten significant redistribution. The
argument of this section is that expectation damages or specific
performance would not be the type of clause that most parties would
prefer in the Chatlos or Dumb/Dumber situations.
6. Seeking to Avoid the Contract Because of a Mistake That Makes the
Contract More Burdensome to the Promisor Titan Anticipated
Without Becoming Correspondingly More
Profitable to the Promisee
This section explores the sixth motive a party might have for making
the choice to enter a contract but then making a choice to breach. This is
a case where the executory portions of the contract have become more
costly to the promisor without an equivalent increase in the value of
those portions of the contract to the promisee. This is the case generally
63. This argument is suggested by the questions raised about Chatlos in E. ALLAN
FARNSWORTH & JOHN HONNOLD, CASES AND MATERIALS ON COMMERCIAL LAW 690 4th
ed. 1985) (asking if expectations should not include expectations regarding remedial
consequences of breach).
64. Cooter & Eisenberg, supra note 8, at 1468 (stating that expectation theory
might not always call for implementation of expectation principle of damages).
thought of as the potentially efficient breach. 5
As an example, suppose that I promise to dig holes in someone's yard
for the purpose of planting flowers. I anticipate that the cost of
rendering the service will be $1000. The owner values the service at
$1500, and we set the contract price at $1250, the money being paid in
advance. Now, however, I encounter ground that is unexpectedly
difficult to move, and my prospective costs increase to $2000. Suppose
further that the owner had to water the ground at her own expense in
anticipation of the drilling and that the water bill was $100. Thus,
reliance damages are $1350 (down payment plus watering expense).
Expectation damages are sometimes measured by the value of the
service ($1500), and at other times by the cost of completion ($2000).
It is not immediately obvious whether reliance or expectation is a
better solution to this particular problem. It is normally thought that the
willingness to pay expectation damages is what distinguishes between
efficient and inefficient breaches. ' This is most evident if expectation
damages are measured by loss in value. If I am willing to breach even
knowing that I will owe $1500 in damages, this is strong evidence that
the contractual duty has become inefficient, more costly to me than it is
beneficial to the owner. The willingness to pay $1350 in reliance
damages would not similarly constitute proof that the contract had
become inefficient.67 I would be willing to breach even if my costs had
risen only to $1375, which would not be a large enough increase in costs
to cause the Kaldor-Hicks efficiency of the overall transaction to be
doubted.6
On the other hand, it does not follow that on these precise facts,
expectation has an efficiency advantage over reliance. The contract has
become inefficient to perform, as costs have risen to $2000. The only
thing that efficient breach theory counsels is that performance should
cease.69 It will cease if damages are measured by expectation, but it will
65. E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS 761-65 (3d ed. 1999) (discussing
efficient breach theory).
66. Robert L. Birmingham, Breach of Contract, Damage Measures, and Economic
Efficiency, 24 RuTGERS L. REv. 273, 285 (1970) (stating that expectation requires
defendant to consider utility schedule of promisee).
67. Id. at 285 (noting that reliance damages create an incentive to commit a breach
that would give defendant a larger share of a smaller joint gain).
68. The Kaldor-Hicks criterion, which contemplates a gain in wealth that
theoretically could be redistributed to make everyone better off, derives from Nicholas
Kaldor, Welfare Propositions of Economics and Interpersonal Comparisons of Utility,
49 ECON. J. 549 (1939); J.R. Hicks, The Foundations of Welfare Economics, 49 EcON. J.
696 (1939).
69. It should be remembered that the various motives are being kept separate here,
and that an actual case may involve a mix of motives. In particular, there may be both
opportunities for efficient breach and risk allocation issues simultaneously. In that case,
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also cease if damages are measured by reliance or indeed if no damages
are awarded for breach. On these precise facts what is needed to
promote efficient breach is not expectation damages as such but any
damages that are lower than my cost of completing the contract.
However, there is a case to be made for reliance damages, as opposed
to any other level of damages that would be below the cost of
completion. As in Motive 5, in the flower case a serious mistake has
been made. I have committed to do the work without realizing the state
of the soil I would be encountering and without conditioning my
obligation on the state of the soil. Perhaps it is harsh to make me go out
and dig the holes no matter how high the costs prove to be, but it is still
my fault that I made an unconditional promise, asserting falsely (in these
circumstances) that I had thereby placed myself under an obligation to
complete the project. By inducing the owner to believe that I would do
the work, I caused the owner to part with a down payment and incur
watering expenses. I should be accountable for those costs of my
careless decision to make an unconditional contract without testing soil
conditions.
In short, if we somehow knew that a breach was efficient, there would
be much to be said for a reliance-based theory of recovery.'a At least in
the normal case where reliance damages are smaller than expectation,
we would not need to worry about the effect of reliance on the decision
to breach or perform. The optimal decision in terms of efficiency is to
breach, and this decision will be reached not only by expectation
damages but by any remedy that is smaller than expectation damages.
Unlike lesser remedies, reliance serves to impose upon the contractor the
cost of her mistake. Unlike expectation, it does not harshly enforce the
mistaken choice itself; it removes the harm that is caused by the
mistaken choice.
Of course, one of the big problems with this analysis is that we often
do not know whether a breach has become efficient. If the courts know
the amount of harm the breach would cause the promisee ($1500) but do
not know the cost of continued performance to the promisor ($1375 or
$2000?), reliance damages no longer seem so attractive." The
expectation damages may be required to vindicate the risk allocation objective even if
efficient breach incentives could have been brought about by lesser damages such as
reliance.
70. Cohen, supra note 45, at 1246 (noting efficient breaches are accidents calling
for reliance damages). Cohen's theories are considered at greater length infra Part Il.C.
71. The difficulty of verifying that particular contingencies have occurred is cited
performing party might be willing to breach even when doing so is
inefficient if her only accountability was for reliance ($1350) rather than
expectation damages. We seem to need expectation ($1500) as a pricing
mechanism for generating efficient incentives to perform in cases of
judicial ignorance about the cost of completion.
Let us summarize the analysis to this point. We began by observing
that contractual breaches are the product of at least two seemingly
inconsistent choices made by the promisor, a choice to make a particular
commitment and a choice to act against that commitment. The
expectation interest and the reliance interest differ primarily in the
choice to which they would call attention. We then asked why a party
would make two such inconsistent choices, and came up with six
motives that could account for that sequence of decisions.
We might divide our results into two categories. The first category
would involve the first four motives examined, while the second
category would involve the last two motives. In the first category
we include the motives to take advantage of nonsimultaneous
performances, to make credible a threat to exploit situational
monopolies, to avoid a rationally placed risk, and to seize the benefits of
information productively brought to the transaction by the other party.
The common denominator of these motives is that the expectation
interest seems to be the best way to handle the breaches they generate.
In the other category we include cases where new information, not
rationally placed as part of a risk but a genuine surprise, makes the
contract unexpectedly harsh. In these cases we saw a much more
plausible case for the reliance interest, though we remain worried about
Motive 6 in situations where we are not sure the breach is efficient and
where we might need expectation damages to tell us.
In Motives 5 and 6 the intuition behind reliance is fundamentally one
of partial excuse, or excuse coupled with responsibility for actual harm
done.72 It may be overly cruel to enforce a mistaken contract against a
party in accordance with its full severity, but that does not mean the
party should be able to represent that it is going to be bound, induce the
other party to incur some harm thereby, and then escape the obligation
with no accountability for the mess her promise has caused.
In discussing the six motives, we have periodically had occasion to
discuss the economics of the problem, that is, the incentive structures
created by legal rules and whether they conduce to private behavior that
as a reason for expectation damages in Steven Shavell, Damage Measures for Breach of
Contract, 11 BELL J. ECON. 466, 468 (1980).
72. Slawson, supra note 1, at 219 (contrasting excused nonperformances with
breaches for remedial purposes).
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is also socially efficient. Thus, we have talked about the problem of
efficient breach and the need for expectation damages to set a price on
breaches. However, our discussion of reliance has primarily been in
terms of moral criteria of partial relief from certain contracts. This
might leave the impression that the reliance/expectation debate is
essentially a contest between retroactive morality and prospective
efficiency considerations. As the next section will argue, however, that
is not the case. There is both a moral and an efficiency account for
reliance, and the two closely track each other. Moreover, there is both a
moral and an efficiency account for expectation, and once again the two
views have a close relationship. The next section discusses these issues
of the relationship between the retroactive moral claims for expectation
and reliance and their prospective efficiency justifications.
I. THE MORALITY AND ECONOMICS OF EXPECTATION AND RELIANCE
A. Expectation, Efficient Breach, and the MoralirvlEfflciency Linkage
What is the proper way to analyze the question of whether reliance or
expectation should be the central organizing principle of contract law?
Should we think about these interests in terms of retrospective justice for
wrongful actions that have already taken place? Or should we think
economically, about the incentives for future actions that wll be brought
about through alternative legal rules?
Many commentators have been impressed by the striking degree of
compatibility between these two approaches to analyzing issues of
private law.73 As one example, consider the issue of mental competence
as a precondition of responsibility. It seems intuitively wrong to blame a
person for conduct that did not emanate from a mind capable of
receiving moral and legal messages. 74 And prospectively, one cannot
expect legal sanctions to be useful in deterring such persons from
committing harmful actions in the future."
73. See generally John Gray, Indirect Utility and Fundanental Rights, I Soc.
PHIL. & POL'Y 73 (1984) (discussing views of utility and fundamental rights): Larry
Alexander, Pursuing the Good-Indirectly, 95 ETmIcs 315 (1985) (discussing Gray's
theory).
74. Stephen J. Morse, Crazy Reasons, 10 J. CoNTMrP. LEGAL ISSUES 189, 193-97
(1999) (discussing capacity for rationality).
75. POSNER, supra note 21, at 258 (stating that the insanity defense selects those
who are undetenable, though civil incapacitation of the undeterrable may be necessary).
Richard Posner has, of course, built a vast system designed to
demonstrate the great extent of compatibility between economic insights
and a common law that was built with retroactive justice principally
in mind.76 However, perhaps the most powerful support for the
compatibility thesis is generated inadvertently by Posner's critics.
Those commentators criticize many of the ideas Posner has supported,
such as the theory of efficient breach, on the ground that immoral
conduct is being countenanced." Invariably, however, the commentators
also argue that the policy would not be efficient when all relevant costs,
including administrative costs, have been considered.78 Moreover, their
moral and economic critiques are not unrelated to each other; rather, it is
claimed that Posner's policies would be immoral because the conduct is
wrong once one considers all of the costs which simultaneously render it
inefficient and worthy of deterrence. Thus, the compatibility thesis is
demonstrated as much in the process of critique of the economic model
as in the process of building that model.
Why should there be a close connection between retroactive
blameworthiness and prospective consequentialist gains? For many
years, I have been attracted to the social evolution hypothesis of
Friedrich Hayek.79  According to Hayek, efficient norms throughout
history have rarely been the product of wise rulers consciously seeking
social efficiency and knowing the proper means of obtaining it.
8
Instead, some societies (or subgroups of those societies) will stumble
upon norms that are relatively conducive to the prosperity of the society
or subgroup.81  Other societies will embrace norms of retroactive
judgment that happen not to conduce as well to future prosperity. The
76. Id. at 271-89 (discussing correlation between moral and economic accounts of
common law).
77. E.g., Peter Linzer, On the Amorality of Contract Remedies-Efficiency, Equity,
and the Second Restatement, 81 COLUM. L. REv. 111, 138-39 (1981); Ian R. Macneil,
Efficient Breach of Contract: Circles in the Sky, 68 VA. L. REv. 947, 961 (1982).
78. Linzer, supra note 77, at 139 (noting that expectation damages are an
inadequate second-best substitute; specific performance would be more efficient);
Macneil, supra note 77, at 968-69 (stating that Posner's model actually encourages
inefficient behavior of breaching first and talking later); see also Henry Mather,
Restitution as a Remedy for Breach of Contract: The Case of the Partially Performing
Seller, 92 YALE L.J. 14, 23 (1982) (stating that breach is not efficient when all
transaction costs included).
79. I have discussed these issues in previous articles. Christopher T. Wonnell,
Four Challenges Facing a Compatibilist Philosophy, 12 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 835,
849 (1989); Christopher T. Wonnell, Problems in the Application of Political Philosophy
to Law, 86 MICH. L. REv. 123, 151-52 (1987).
80. Friedrich A. von Hayek, The Origins and Effects of Our Morals: A Problem
for Science, in THE ESSENCE OF HAYEK 318, 318-19 (Chiaki Nishiyama & Kurt R. Leube
eds., 1984).
81. CHANDRAN KUKATHAS, HAYEK AND MODERN LIBERALISM 174-80 (1989)
(discussing the role of tradition vis-t-vis reason in Hayek).
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wealthier societies will expand their influence in a variety of ways. At
least in the earlier periods, the wealthier societies will be able to support
larger and larger populations. Wealthier societies and groups will have
their norms and practices imitated by others. Competition from the
wealthier societies will tend to compel changes in the norms of the less
wealthy. Conquest by the wealthy may also play a role.' And wealthier
societies can afford to support classes of people whose role it is to
systematize, extend, and disseminate the norms of that society.
In short, one will observe the increasing dominance of those norms
that happened to conduce to the pursuit of wealth for the society that
stumbled upon them. The Darwinian analogy would be that animals
tend to have the types of organs that conduce to their own survival and
reproduction, without having consciously known how to produce them,
because those animals whose organs were less conducive have been
outcompeted. As Hayek has stressed, the Darwinian analogy is
imperfect, because natural selection operates upon individuals and their
genetic endowments, while social evolution operates upon groups and
their social practices.' In neither case would one expect perfect
compatibility. After all, if natural selection were perfect, the science of
medicine would have no role to play. The conservative message,
however, is that doctors or social engineers are likely to do better by
tinkering with the evolved structures and their internal logic rather than
attempting to build entirely new structures to replace those that have
evolved.'
82. Of course, this factor can cut both ways. Societies that are not particularly
wealthy or civilized can succeed, at least for a time, by specializing in military conquest.
One thinks of the challenge of Sparta to Athens, of the Germanic tribes to the Romans,
of the Mongols to the Chinese, and perhaps in this century of the Communist world to
the West. However, the greater wealth should in principle make it possible to have
military power greater than the other societies, especially given the technological factor
in warfare, so that a trend can be observed over time toward civilized nations
overcoming purely military ones.
83. F.A. HAYEK, LAW, LEGISLATION AND LIBERTY 23 (1973) ("The error of 'Social
Darwinism' was that it concentrated on the selection of individuals rather than on that of
institutions and practices, and on the selection of innate rather than on culturally
transmitted capacities of the individuals.").
84. Hayek famously wrote a postscript on the topic of "Why I Am Not a
Conservative." F.A. HAYEK, Why I Ain Not a Conservative, in THE CONSTrr'YrON OF
LIBERTY 397-411 (1960). However, in the particular respect of a belief that institutions
evolve rather than are created, it seems fair to characterize Hayek's views as
conservative. The issue is discussed in KUKATHAS, supra note 81, at 178-87, which also
concludes that Hayek's views differ profoundly from those of conservatives such as
Oakeshott.
Recognizing the fallibility of the method, one can start with a
presumption or guess that compatibility will exist between the
backward-looking norms of our evolved morality and common law and
the forward-looking calculus of economic instrumentalism. Importantly,
to the extent that this hypothesis is valid, one can use economic
reasoning as a kind of check on moral judgments and vice versa. As
Randy Barnett has stressed, there can be virtues to redundancy of
normative systems, where one can work back and forth between moral
norms and economic judgments, with the confidence in each growing to
the extent it can be reconciled with the other.' One can look to existing
practices which seem immoral from a retroactive point of view as
heuristics to identify places where some hitherto unperceived
inefficiency exists in the incentive structure. One can also look at the
economic analysis of a problem to clarify what one believes about
retroactive justice.
Consider once again the idea that expectation damages are the
appropriate remedy for breach of contract because they effectively
distinguish between efficient and inefficient breaches. Posner's original
example of this was a seller who had contracted to sell a product to
Buyer 1 and then received a higher offer from Buyer 2 for the product
and breached the contract with Buyer 1.86 The example struck many
noneconomic commentators as immoral, countenancing a kind of theft
of a property right that Buyer 1 had procured.87 The seller's behavior
was antisocial, requiring litigation over damages instead of trying to
work things out within the framework of the contract. The interesting
thing is that this moral objection provided a heuristic that something
may have been wrong with the economic analysis. The breach may not
have been an efficient one after all. If Buyer 2 did indeed value the
product more than Buyer 1, the original contract would not stand in the
way of a second transaction between Buyer 1 and Buyer 2.88 This was
not a case where performance had become more costly to the seller
without becoming more beneficial to the buyer. Performance was more
valuable to Buyer 1 than anticipated because of the new resale
opportunity. There were transaction costs involved in a second sale
85. Randy E. Barnett, The Virtues of Redundancy in Legal Thought, 38 CLEV. ST.
L. REv. 153, 153 (1990).
86. POSNER, supra note 21, at 133 (discussing widgets valued more highly by
pianola factory).
87. Patricia H. Marschall, Willfulness: A Crucial Factor in Choosing Remedies for
Breach of Contract, 24 ARIz. L. REv. 733, 760-61 (1982) (stating that willful breaches
should not be excused on grounds of efficiency).
88. William Bishop, The Choice of Remedy for Breach of Contract, 14 J. LEGAL
STUD. 299, 301-02 (1985) (distinguishing contracts to do from contracts to give, arguing
that the former is less likely to present opportunities for efficient breach).
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between Buyer 1 and Buyer 2, but those were likely to be dwarfed by the
negotiation and litigation costs involved in breach and damages. The
moral argument had shown the way for an improvement in the
economics.
But the opposite is true as well. In some cases the efficiency analysis
seemed sound in its own right, as when the defendant encountered rock
during drilling that increased the defendant's costs without increasing
the value of the drilling to the plaintiff or anyone else. Still, the critics
said that the idea of efficient breach was amoral, allowing the defendant
to profit from its own wrong. The tension between a sound economic
account and a moral objection in this case can lead to the view that it is
the moral intuition that needs to be refined.
What is crucially missing from the standard moral accounts of the
efficient breach situation is any emphasis on the morality of plaintiffs
behavior. In a true efficient breach setting, a plaintiff is not
fundamentally interested in whether the contract is actually performed,
but instead finds irresistible the temptation to threaten the full
performance she does not want in fact as a way of exploiting the
defendant's extra burden and using the defendant's desperation to avoid
the burden as a source of plaintiff's extra profit. The more miserable
performance has become for the defendant, the more the plaintiff has an
incentive to feign a desire to insist on that performance, even if the
performance has no value to him whatsoever, and to relent only in
exchange for payments that had nothing to do with the project to have
flowers planted in one's yard. The problem is essentially one of bad
faith, as the plaintiff is using the letter of the contract in a manner
inconsistent with its "spirit" or his purpose for having entered it.? In
short, the economics of efficient breach leads us to reexamine the
morality of the situation, not so much to change our morality as to
realize something about the retroactive moral assessment of behavior
that we already believed but had not articulated.
It is sometimes said that ex post negotiations can avoid the ,problem of
efficient breach regardless of the legal rule of damages.9 This is
89. Evasion of the spirit of a contract is a recognized species of bad faith.
RESTATmENT, supra note 4, § 205 cmt. d; Robert S. Summers, "Good Faith" in
General Contract Lanv and the Sales Provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code, 54
VA. L. REy. 195, 201 (1968) (discussing good faith as "excluder" of various forms of
bad faith such as evasion of spirit of deal).
90. Duncan Kennedy & Frank Michelman, Are Property and Contract Efficient?.
8 HOFSA L. REV. 711,743 (1980) (noting that choice of contract remedy is essentially
essentially an attempted application of the Coase theorem.9 If damages
are above expectation, the promisor can try to buy his way out of the
contract by paying the promisee an amount between the value of the
contract to the promisee and the cost to the promisor. And if damages
are below expectation, say at the reliance level, the promisee can pay the
promisor the extra amount needed to induce the promisor not to breach
inefficiently.
There are a number of problems with ex post negotiations as a
solution, and many of these problems will be discussed later in the
Article.92 For now, however, one can simply note that these negotiations
are between parties contractually locked into each other, creating a
bilateral monopoly with well known problems of bluffing and high
transaction costs regarding the contractual surplus.' The economic
problem of situational monopoly bargaining again corresponds to the
moral doubts about the subject matter of these negotiations. When
damages are too high, the promisee is attempting to gauge how
desperately the promisor has become trapped and contorted through its
inefficient commitment, while the promisor is trying to conceal the
extent of its mistake. And when damages are too low, the promisee is
essentially trying to bribe the defendant to do what she had already
solemnly promised to do, while the defendant is trying to assess whether
the plaintiff might be more desperate for performance at this point than
she was when the contract was made.
Moreover, as Robert Cooter and Melvin Eisenberg have stressed,
much efficient breach analysis concerns the optimal amount of
precaution to take against the possibility of an inadvertent breach. 4 For
example, the defendant can decide whether to assign its more or its less
reliable employee to deliver a particular crank shaft. If the efficient
thing to do is to assign the less reliable employee to the particular
contract and use the more reliable employee elsewhere, there is likely to
be a problem with supercompensatory damages. The fear of those
damages will tend to cause the firm to allocate its employees to avoid
the legal penalty even if the actual economic harm from the unreliable
determined by renegotiation costs).
91. The Coase theorem posits that on certain restrictive assumptions, a Pareto-
optimal resource allocation can be reached independently of the initial assignment of
property rights by virtue of bargaining. WERNER Z. HIRSCH, LAW AND ECONOMICS: AN
INTRODUCTORY ANALYSIS (2d ed. 1988). Coase's original point was made in R.H.
Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960).
92. See infra notes 270-76, 280-81, and accompanying text.
93. POSNER, supra note 21, at 131 (stating that bilateral monopoly problem may
interfere with ex post negotiations).
94. Cooter & Eisenberg, supra note 8, at 1464 (noting that expectation optimizes
precautions against inadvertent breach).
[VoL. 38: 53, 2001] Two Contractual Wrongs
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
employee would be greater elsewhere. And here again it is hard to see
how negotiation could solve the problem. The plaintiff does not know
enough about the defendant's business to be able to enter contracts that
specifically permit particular employees to be used on the project.9 And
if damages are undercompensatory relative to the expectation interest,
the defendant would have an incentive to exercise too few precautions
unless the plaintiff could somehow figure out how the defendant could
run her business more efficiently and bribe her to take the extra
precaution.
In short, expectation damages have a sound basis in morality and in
economics, and the two explanations tend to go hand in hand. Can the
same be said for reliance damages? That question is explored in the next
section.
B. The Morality and Economics of Reliance
Earlier in this Article, a possible moral argument for reliance was
discussed.9 The reliance interest seemed well suited to a case where the
contract ought to be excused for unanticipated harshness, but where the
promisor was still at fault for having led the promisee to believe that his
promise was unconditional. Unlike expectation, reliance did not involve
the courts in cruelly enforcing the pound of flesh that the promisee had
managed to exact from the mistaken promisor. In light of the discussion
of Hayek's social evolution hypothesis, the interesting question is
whether these moral intuitions can point the way to efficiency benefits of
the reliance interest.
The answer is that an efficiency argument can be made in the mistake
scenario. Expectation essentially means that a mistake will result in
significant redistribution of wealth from the mistaken to the nonmistaken
party. The prospect of that redistribution in turn has incentive effects.
Plaintiff has an incentive to seek out and exploit mistaken parties, even
95. Richard Craswell, Contract Remedies, Renegotiation, and the Theory of
Efficient Breach, 61 S. CAL. L. Ray. 630, 647-48 (1988) (stating ex post negotiations no
help when efficiency concerns precaution taking).
96. See supra notes 11-19 and accompanying text.
97. The point has been made in the context of restitution for mistake. Peter K.
Huber, Mistaken Transfers and Profitable Infringement on Property Rights: An
Economic Analysis, 49 LA. L. REV. 71, 99 (1988) (refusing restitution would create "an
overincentive to avoid mistaken improvements"); Christopher T. Vonnell, Replacing the
Unitary Principle of Unjust Enrichment, 45 EMORY LJ. 153, 197 (1996) (discussing
incomplete divestiture of property).
if their services are not actually wanted, just to extort expectation-based
settlement payments. As the economist Jack Hirshleifer has shown,
there can be significant inefficiencies in racing to contract with people
who are not yet informed about the alternatives available in the market.98
Another effect is that the mistaken party will have an enormous
incentive to avoid her mistakes. This might seem to be a good thing, but
it is actually too much of a good thing. The expectation interest means
that the private cost to the defendant of making a mistake will be much
higher than the social cost, by virtue of the redistribution worked by
expectation. This will give the defendant an excessive incentive to avoid
mistakes, that is, an incentive to devote inefficiently large amounts of
resources to ensuring that mistakes never happen, no matter how little
social harm would result from the making and rapid correction of
mistakes. And one way to avoid mistakes is to refuse to enter into
particular types of otherwise useful contracts out of a fear that one might
be mistaken.9
Indeed, the reliance interest seems the ideal solution to this particular
problem. The reliance interest is the harm that is caused by the mistaken
promise itself, that is, wasted expenditures by the promisee or
permanently foregone alternatives. Facing the reliance interest, the
defendant will have an incentive to devote optimal amounts of resources,
not maximum amounts, to the avoidance of mistakes."°° The plaintiff
will have no incentive to cause mistakes or seek out mistaken parties, for
the defendant would be able to escape the mistaken contract upon the
mere reimbursement of the expenditures plaintiff had incurred in
reliance.
Of course, it is important to remember the lesson from the discussion
of Motive 4 above.'0 ' Sometimes contracting with people who have
limited information is a productive rather than a redistributive
enterprise.'O° If the party was going to be uninformed for a considerable
period of time, and if that ignorance was likely to cause the party to act
inefficiently with respect to her resources, then the movement of the
resource to the informed party can be both Kaldor-Hicks efficient and
mutually beneficial to the parties. If that is true, it would be unwise to
98. Hirshleifer, supra note 44.
99. Wolcher, supra note 14, at 798 (stating that relentless enforcement of
contractual expectancy can deter making of promises).
100. Cohen, supra note 45, at 1246-48 (pointing out that expectation encourages
excessive precaution, whereas reliance encourages optimal amount).
101. See supra notes 35-49 and accompanying text.
102. ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND EcONOMICS 112-16 (1988). The
authors recognize that theoretical arguments exist that the market will produce too little
or too much search for information; however, a better theory is needed for distinguishing
which concrete information fits which situation. Id.
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allow the uninformed party to escape her contractual obligations upon
the payment of reliance damages. Precisely because that form of remedy
would leave the informed party with no profit on the transaction, merely
erasing losses, it would fail to encourage a productive activity.
It might be argued that this efficiency gain presupposes a defendant
who never would have become informed, and is inapplicable to someone
who has become sufficiently aware of her previous state of ignorance
that she wants to avoid the contract upon the payment of reliance
damages. This is a powerful but not a conclusive point. In some cases
the defendant's new information may exist only because of the contract,
as in the example of the farmer who only discovers there is oil on the
land because of the buyer's activities after the contract. In still other
cases the contract may constitute a rational placement of the risk that the
defendant would not become better informed, and the defendant would
then be seeking to undo that rationally placed risk by seeking relief from
the contract upon mere payment of reliance damages. And in still other
cases the defendant may be breaching for reasons that are unrelated to
her discovery that the original contract was a mistake, and is using
information obtained in the discovery process as an excuse for breach
that was otherwise motivated.
Despite the potential for the constructive use of private information,
there will be many situations in which contracting with a mistaken party
is primarily a redistributive rather than a productive enterprise. In some
of those situations, one would not want to award either reliance or
expectation damages to the informed party. Suppose that the informed
party realizes that she is entering contracts for the purpose of
redistributing wealth from the uninformed party to herself, and to avoid
complications let us further assume that this is not a speculative trade in
which both parties consciously think of themselves as placing a bet that
they are better informed than their trading partner. In this case it is
presumably not enough for the law to fail to encourage the plaintiff's
enterprise by denying expectation. One would instead want to
affirmatively discourage the enterprise by denying reliance damages as
well.1
03
Once again, reliance damages make sense in the wake of contracts that
have become unenforceable, but it matters why the contract is
unenforceable. The promisor is liable for reliance damages if those
103. See Cohen, supra note 45, at 1252 (stating that neither reliance nor expectation
is appropriate for intentionally misleading party).
reliance damages are her own fault, the product of carelessly misleading
an innocent promisee into relying on what purports to be a binding
contractual obligation. If the promisee is not the innocent victim of a
careless promisor's mistake but rather the purposeful exploiter of known
mistakes, there is no reason to award reliance damages to the promisee.
To summarize, there is indeed a close correlation between the morality
and the economics of reliance, in keeping with Hayek's social evolution
hypothesis. Morally, we seek to avoid the harsh exploitation of mistakes
while still holding the carelessly mistaken party accountable for the
actual harm caused by her having created an apparent contractual
obligation. Economically, this level of sanction encourages an optimal
amount of care in the decision to contract. And, as noted earlier, there
is also a close correlation between the morality and the economics
of expectation. The problem is how to reconcile the two sets of
moralleconomic intuitions, a difficult project that is taken up in the next
section.
C. A Theoretical Reconciliation of Expectation and Reliance,
and Some Pragmatic Administrative Doubts
We proceed with some confidence, because our tools-expectation
and reliance-seem to be validated by the potent combination of
backward-looking moral intuitions and forward-looking efficiency
calculations. Unfortunately, melding the two intuitions is not at all easy.
Going back to our original observation that contractual breach
involves at least two choices, it is clear that this fact maps directly onto
the reliance/expectation dichotomy. Reliance is concerned with
optimizing the amount of care undertaken in making the initial choice to
contract. Expectation is concerned with optimizing the second choice as
to whether to perform or breach. Economically speaking, both reliance
and expectation operate as kinds of prices on behavior. The problem is
that we seem to have only one policy instrument-the amount of
damages to assess after a promise has been both made and broken.
However, a single price cannot, except by coincidence, optimize two
sets of behaviors.1°N
On the blackboard, it might be possible to envision a remedy that
represents a kind of optimal trade-off between an otherwise suboptimal
amount of care in the making of promises and otherwise suboptimal
decisions on whether to perform or breach. Such an idea almost
certainly cannot be expected to work. For one thing, there is no
104. Shavell, supra note 71, at 484-88 (noting that it is hard for damages to
optimize performance and reliance decisions simultaneously).
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doctrinal support for a remedy that is neither expectation nor reliance but
some scientifically blended compromise between the two.' Moreover,
the task of identifying the optimal amount of damages that would lead to
the minimum combined number of distortions for the two separate
decisions seems hopelessly difficult. And even if the "optimal" mix
could be found, one would still have the errors at both ends which would
make the approach inferior to one that actually sought the best possible
answer for each of the two policies separately.
The only hope would seem to be to use the pricing mechanism to
optimize one of these behaviors, and to attempt to optimize the other one
directly by judicial balancing. There is precedent for this idea in the law
and economics literature and in the law itself. It has often been noted
that one problem with both expectation and reliance damages is that they
could potentially lead to overreliance by the promisee."° These remedies
act in theory as complete insurance against losses caused by relying, and
complete insurance tends to cause moral hazard problems. Sometimes
nonperformance of a contract is inevitable, and we may not want
promisees to act as if performance were certain by completely
abandoning all backup options. The solution proposed in the literature
for this problem is to assess the damages against defendant which would
have occurred if the plaintiff had relied efficiently.'1 It is argued that the
law actually embodies this norm with its requirement that reliance be
foreseeable or reasonably expected."° Similar reasoning is involved in
the duty to mitigate, which assesses damages against the defendant
based upon the harm the plaintiff would have suffered if he had acted
reasonably-or, as the economist would say, efficiently-after the
105. There are, of course, limitations on expectation damages such as the denial of
attorney's fees, the certainty and foreseeability limitations, mitigation of damages, the
denial of emotional distress damages, and the like. But while these limitations may
result in damages that are between reliance and expectation, there is no reason to believe
they would be even the approximate mix of the two interests that would optimize the two
decisions of contracting.
106. E.g., Cooter & Eisenberg, supra note 8, at 1466-67; Richard Craswell,
Performance, Reliance, and One-Sided Information, 18 J. LEGAL SluD. 365, 365-56
(1989).
107. Craswell, supra note 106, at 365-66 ('The only remedy capable of optimizing
both parties' incentives.., is one that limits the promisee to recovering no more than the
value that his expectation interest would have had if he had chosen the socially optimal
level of reliance.") (emphasis in original).
108. Slawson, supra note 1, at 230 (explaining how the foresceability rule
eliminates problem that expectation could lead to overreliance).
breach occurs.'9
These approaches require a judicial decision as to what is efficient
(reasonable) reliance or efficient (reasonable) mitigation behavior, as
there is no price being applied that, by an invisible hand, will tend to
optimize these actions by the promisee. However, if that judicial
decision has been made correctly-or, more realistically, if the errors are
not too egregious"--the pricing mechanism can be used as the invisible
hand approach to optimize the defendant's breach-or-perform behavior
without the court's having to know the optimally efficient breach-or-
perform action itself. This general approach seems to be the best way to
proceed in trying to deal with the reliance/expectation dilemma of
optimizing the two separate contractual choices.
Let us tentatively consider the following two principles:
Principle 1. Unless the parties otherwise provide and subject to
Principle 2, the measure of damages following a breach of contract is the
amount needed to take the promisee from the position she actually
occupies-or, if the promisee has behaved unreasonably after the
contract was entered, the position the promisee would have occupied had
she behaved reasonably-to the position the promisee would have
occupied if the promise had been fulfilled.
Principle 2. When the court judges that conditions (A) through (C)
are all present, the measure of damages following a breach of contract is
the amount needed to take the promisee from the position she actually
occupies--or, if the promisee has behaved unreasonably after the
contract was entered, the position the promisee would have occupied had
she behaved reasonably-to the position the promisee would have
occupied if the promise had not been made:
(A) Full enforcement of the contract would be unjust by virtue of
extreme and unreasonable hardship to the promisor caused by a mistake
or change in circumstances that was not within the risk provided for in
the contract expressly or by implication.
(B) The promisor is nevertheless at fault for having made an
unconditional promise to the promisee which the promisor could
reasonably have expected to induce, and which has induced, detrimental
reliance by the promisee.
(C) The promisor has not behaved unreasonably with respect to her
contractual responsibilities.
These two standards have been purposely characterized as
109. RESTATEMENT, supra note 4, § 350(1) ("Except as stated in Subsection (2),
damages are not recoverable for loss that the injured party could have avoided without
undue risk, burden or humiliation.").
110. The problems of attempting to measure judicially the optimal level of reliance
are discussed in Craswell, supra note 106, at 365-66.
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"principles" rather than "rules." They certainly contain a number of
vague terms that one might view as objectionable in vesting the court
with excessive discretion."' I have no desire to argue against this
objection, and indeed share the worry about excessive judicial power."'
Very likely it would be helpful to develop concrete rules that embody
these principles in some more formalistic way. But the expectation
interest and the reliance interest are also principles. They have proven
highly productive in helping us think about and structure concrete rules
but are in themselves too vague to serve as determinate legal rules. The
proposed principles are a reconciliation of reliance and expectation
which operates on the same general level of abstraction that they do.
The first principle sets forth the general rule of contract damages as
expectation. The argument for expectation as the general rule is very
strong. As noted earlier, in four of the six motives for breach of
contract-profiting from nonsimultaneous performances, threatening to
exploit situational monopolies, seeking to avoid contractually placed
risks, and attempting to confiscate information profitably brought to the
contract by the other party-reliance essentially has no role to play."1
3
Moreover, even when surprise and regret are key motives, it is very
helpful to have expectation damages as a pricing mechanism for the
decision on whether to perform or breach, and the related decision
concerning the amount of precaution to take against inadvertent breach.
One should abandon this pricing mechanism and go with imperfect
judicial fact finding about efficient behavior under the contract only
when some unreasonably large mistake makes this seem necessary.
The first principle states that it is subject to contrary agreement of the
parties. This is an important point that, as Richard Epstein has stressed,
tends to be forgotten in discussions of contractual remedies."" We are
111. Promissory estoppel is often celebrated for the flexibility of remedy that it
permits. E.g., Jay M. Feinman, Promissory Estoppel and Judicial Method, 97 HARV. L.
REv. 678, 711 (1984) (stating that promissory estoppel necessitates balancing in every
case, something that cannot be done consistently with liberal assumptions); Eric Mills
Holmes, Restatement of Promissory Estoppel, 32 WIt.LLAjM'E L. REv. 263, 270 (1996)
(noting that some states have reached the highest and most progressive phase of
promissory estoppel, the "equity phase" in which remedies are flexible).
112. It has been argued that the courts applying promissory estoppel do not in fact
embrace the flexibility of remedy approach. Eg., Paul T. Wangerin, supra note 11, at
91-92 ("Judicial acceptance of the flexible damages remedy... has been, at most,
nominal."); Edward Yorio & Steve Thel, The Promissory Basis of Section 90, 101 YALE
LJ. 111, 136 (1991).
113. See supra notes 21-49 and accompanying texL
114. Richard A. Epstein, Beyond Foreseeability: Consequential Damages in the
attempting to provide the kinds of remedies that the parties would
rationally seek themselves to govern various scenarios of contractual
nonperformance, but the parties themselves may know things about their
concrete situation that would make general rules unwise.
The law has been somewhat reluctant, as evidenced by its attitude
about penalty clauses, to allow parties to vary remedial rules by mutual
consent.' There does not, however, seem to be any categorical reason
why all substantive terms of the contract should be treated with great
judicial deference while all remedial terms are subject to strict scrutiny.
There is probably some truth to the notion that remedial terms are often
not terribly salient to many contractual parties, who probably expect that
the contract will be either performed or worked out privately in the great
bulk of cases."6  But at least where the parties are reasonably
sophisticated and the ex ante stakes in remedial issues are large, the law
should not use its remedial rules against the choices of the very parties
whose mutually beneficial transactions the law is seeking to facilitate.
The law needs standards for when parties are too unsophisticated and/or
issues too improbable for formal contract terms to be treated as strong
evidence of consent,' 7 and those standards should be applied to remedial
terms of the contract as well as substantive terms."8
The two principles differ with regard to the "rightful position" that the
parties should have been able to occupy."9 When Principle 1 applies,
that rightful position is the position of a promisee who has seen the
Law of Contract, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 105, 107 (1989) (explaining that the focus should
not be on law's external "purpose" of contract damages but on the parties' purposes in
selecting particular damage rules).
115. U.C.C. § 2-718(1) (1989). The section states:
Damages for breach by either party may be liquidated in the agreement but
only at an amount which is reasonable in the light of the anticipated or actual
harm caused by the breach, the difficulties of proof of loss, and the
inconvenience or nonfeasibility of otherwise obtaining an adequate remedy. A
term fixing unreasonably large liquidated damages is void as a penalty.
Id.
116. But see Epstein, supra note 114, at 109 ("It is just not credible to assume that
commercial parties draft toward performance but ignore breach in ways that justify more
vigorous judicial intervention on remedial questions.").
117. RESTATEMENT, supra note 4, § 211(3) ("Where the other party has reason to
believe that the party manifesting such assent would not do so if he knew that the writing
contained a particular term, the term is not part of the agreement.").
118. Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, Liquidated Damages, Penalties and the
Just Compensation Principle: Some Notes on an Enforcement Model and a Theory of
Efficient Breach, 77 COLUM. L. REv. 554, 594 (1977) ("The modem development of
unconscionability as a unifying fairness principle presents a less costly alternative to the
sweeping invalidation powers exercised under the penalty rule.").
119. Cooter & Eisenberg, supra note 8, at 1435-36 ("Because there are two
different conceptions of the uninjured state in a contract setting, there are also two
different conceptions of compensation.").
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promisor keep the promise. When Principle 2 applies, the rightful
position is the position of a person who never received a promise from
the promisor. However, the two principles are the same in another
respect, which is the starting point for the measuring of the distance to
the rightful position. They do not take the promisee from the position
she currently occupies to the rightful position, if the position the
promisee currently occupies is the result of her own unreasonable
behavior under the contract.'" This is necessary because a contrary view
would create a moral hazard by encouraging unreasonable behavior on
the part of fully insured promisees, a problem that exists equally for the
expectation and for the reliance interest. 2 '
Let us now look more carefully at the second principle calling for
reliance damages if the court judges that three conditions are present.
The first condition is that full enforcement would be unjust in light of
extreme and unreasonable hardship to the promisor caused by mistake or
change in circumstances. This immediately eliminates Motives I and 2
discussed earlier, that is, nonsimultaneous performances and situational
monopolies, which involve the very scenarios which induced the parties
to contract in the first place.'" Motive 3 of escaping risk-allocation is
also expressly excluded by the rule. In a fundamental sense, the new
information is not indicative of having made a mistake in the prior
situation where the contract was mutually beneficial ex ante precisely
because the unavoidable ignorance created an opportunity for efficient
risk allocation. Motive 4 of seizing information productively brought to
bear is intended to be excluded as well because it is not "unjust" to
enforce the contract in those circumstances; undoubtedly actual rules
implementing these principles would want to spell out when that is the
case. Thus, reliance is really applicable only in cases presenting
Motives 5 and 6 above, where the original decision is regretted severely
by virtue of new information.
120. I do not necessarily intend to embrace completely the idea of "efficient
reliance." Contracts are, after all, designed to facilitate reliance, and if the parties desire
that reliance to be restrained, they can write that into the contract as well. See Slawson,
supra note 1, at 229-32 (noting that parties rather than courts should determine efficient
level of reliance). However, the idea seems less controversial when applied to the duty
to mitigate, and the standard embraced in the text leaves the issue open by requiring only
"reasonable" behavior by the promisee. Id at 231.
121. For a more thorough discussion of the concept of efficient reliance, see
William P. Rogerson, Efficient Reliance and Damage Measures for Breach of Contract,
15 RAND J. ECON. 39 (1984).
122. See supra notes 21-26 and accompanying text.
The test is not harshness to the promisor as such, but rather harshness
in view of mistakes or changes in circumstances. Many promises are
quite harsh but nevertheless rational and necessary to the promisor in
light of the promisor's accurate assessment of the limited options
available to her. Courts that set aside promises on this ground are
sometimes said to be engaged in "substantive" as opposed to
"procedural" unconscionability analysis, " and law and economics
writers have properly viewed the practice as problematic. 4  It is
important not to further disempower people who already have limited
contractual options by denying full enforceability to the promises they
make, where those promises are rational, well-informed, and not
defeated by serious changes in circumstances. " ' To the extent that one
wishes to think of Principle 2 as a "partial relief from unconscionability"
rule, it should be understood as a partial relief from procedural
unconscionability.
16
The (B) criterion in Principle 2 is that the promisor was at fault in
making an unconditional promise, and that the promisee was foreseeably
harmed by her detrimental reliance on the promise. The promisor would
be most likely to be at fault when the mistake or change in
circumstances concerned matters as to which the promisor had access to
better information than the promisee. Again there would be no
applicability to the promisee who knowingly exploited the promisor's
mistake in order to accomplish a redistributive objective. 27 The logic of
this criterion is clearly tort-like, showing that the "death of contract"
scholars were not completely wrong.'8 However, it does not follow that
one would want to import all of the rules of "tort" into this area, such as
the allowance of punitive or emotional distress damages, or that one
would want to exclude all "contract" rules, such as the statute of frauds
123. E.g., Leff, supra note 37, at 486-87.
124. E.g., Richard A. Epstein, Unconscionability: A Critical Reappraisal, 18 J.L. &
ECON. 293, 305-15 (1975) (stating that actual uses of unconscionability have harmed
weaker parties).
125. I have argued elsewhere that the refusal of courts to fully enforce the promises
made by employees has resulted in their being disempowered and harmed. Christopher
T. Wonnell, The Contractual Disempowerment of Employees, 46 STAN. L. REv. 87, 104-
15 (1993).
126. Professor Eisenberg has stressed the links between the expectation/reliance
remedial debate and the substantive debate over adequacy of consideration. Melvin
Aron Eisenberg, The Bargain Principle and Its Limits, 95 HARv. L. REv. 741, 745
(1982) (noting that the bargain principle is as much a rule about remedies as substantive
entitlements).
127. See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
128. An early statement of the proposition that promissory estoppel was an
essentially tort-like notion was Orvill C. Snyder, Promissory Estoppel as Tort, 35 IOWA
L. REv. 28, 48 (1949) (stating that there are more likenesses with the tort of deception
than with contract).
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and the parol evidence rule.' If anything, "contract" rules that have
been designed with business transactions in mind may be better suited to
handle the problems of contractually related torts than "tort" rules that
were designed with other paradigm cases in mind, such as personal
injuries and property damage. But beyond this there is not much more
to be said at a general level, and each contract and tort rule should be
examined to see whether it is well suited to administering a contractually
related tort.
Criterion (B) purposely does not require that the detrimental reliance
be "definite and substantial." This language was present in the section
90 promissory estoppel rule of the Restatement of Contracts."' It was
deleted from the same provision in the Restatement (Second), although
some courts continue to apply the earlier rule.' The theory of the
deletion was that "definite and substantial" reliance was important as
long as one assumed that expectation damages were the only possible
remedy for promissory estoppel, while the Restatement (Second) was
designed to accord courts discretion in awarding either expectation or
reliance damages."' The point is all the more true for Principle 2, which
is designed to award reliance damages. If reliance is de minimis,
damages will also be de minimis and the section will not be particularly
important, although it will do no harm either. A substantiality rule
would be required if large stakes, such as the ability to enforce a
mistaken contract according to its terms, turned on whether there had
been reliance, but that is not the spirit of Principle 2.
Criterion (C) of Principle 2 is the most challenging of all, and the one
that gives the greatest pragmatic doubt about the ability of the system to
handle this principle administratively. It requires that the promisor must
not have behaved unreasonably with respect to his or her contractual
responsibilities. From an economic perspective, one can view
"reasonableness" as acting efficiently in the situation. Thus, one is
129. Mark P. Gergen, Liability for Mistake in Contract Formation, 64 S. CAL. L
REv. 1, 4 (1990) (explaining that undesirable features of tort damages make it
appropriate to introduce tort-law notions within contract rather than tort law).
130. RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTs § 90 (1932). The history of the "definite and
substantial" language is discussed in Yorio & Thel, supra note 112, at 125-27.
131. RESTATEMENT, supra note 4, § 90; Knapp, supra note 6, at 56 (discussing
changes made by Restatement (Second) to promissory estoppel doctrine).
132. Stanley D. Henderson, Promissoty Estoppel and Traditional Contract
Doctrine, 78 YALE L.J. 343, 384 (1969) ("If, on the other hand, limited or partial
enforcement comes to be recognized as the norm in Section 90 cases, the test of
substantial reliance is likely to merge with the test of 'injustice."').
essentially engaged in a cost-benefit analysis of the kind that is familiar
in tort law from Carroll Towing. 33 Because Principle 2 contemplates
reliance rather than expectation damages, we do not have the pricing
mechanism that can distinguish between efficient and inefficient
breaches as if by an invisible hand. So there is no choice but to have the
court try to make the efficiency distinctions itself, as it does in tort cases
under the Carroll Towing formula.'-
The idea is that the seriously mistaken party has a privilege to rescind
upon the payment of reliance damages, but loses that privilege by
inefficient behavior under the contract itself. If the principle is carried
out correctly, it avoids the worst problems of the reliance interest. For
example, we noted earlier that the reliance interest might allow the
defendant to commit some opportunistic breaches with impunity if they
were committed as part of an ongoing transaction from which the
promisee had already received significant benefits. 3 No such free pass
for inefficient breaches would be contemplated by Principle 2, as such
inefficiency would forfeit the right to limit damages to the reliance
interest.
By inefficient behavior, what is meant is a "sunk" action or failure to
act that has produced more harm to the promisee's contractual rights
than benefit to the promisor. For example, the defendant failed to
deliver goods on time, resulting in sales losses for the plaintiff exceeding
any benefits of delay. Or the defendant promised to use a particular
material, but cut comers and used a material that was slightly cheaper
but significantly less valuable to the plaintiff. Reliance damages will not
optimally deter these inefficient choices, so it is important that a
defendant who engages in such choices must answer in expectation.
These are sunk decisions, that is, the inefficiency has already occurred.
The social cost can be moved around by damages but it cannot be
eliminated.
An important question is whether repudiation of future duties would
be covered by criterion (C) of Principle 2. The answer is that
repudiation is indeed covered by criterion (C), but only if the repudiating
(or rescinding) behavior is unreasonable or inefficient in the
circumstances. The fact that the remaining duties under a contract are
Kaldor-Hicks efficient does not mean that a repudiation or rescinding of
those duties is an unreasonable or inefficient act. There might be other
parties who could complete the performance as efficiently as the
133. United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947).
134. Id. The economic interpretation of Carroll Towing derives from Richard A.
Posner, A Theory of Negligence, I J. LEGAL STUD. 29, 73-77 (1972).
135. See supra notes 21-26 and accompanying text.
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mistaken party seeking relief, and if that is not the case, the mistaken
party herself might stand willing to complete the project on terms that
were mutually beneficial. Indeed, in many "relational" cases in which
parties have become locked into each other by relationship-specific
investments over time, the practical effect of Principle 2 is to serve as a
background rule in the shadow of which contractual modifications can
be negotiated when circumstances have changed."' On the other hand,
repudiation certainly can be an inefficient act, as when an insurance
company announces after a fire but before a claim has been filed that it
is rescinding an insurance policy and offering to return premiums. The
failure to cover the risk defeats an efficient enterprise, and no one else
will be willing to offer insurance after the fire has already occurred.'
It goes without saying that it is extraordinarily difficult for the court to
make the cost-benefit decisions that criterion (C) requires, determining
whether the promisor has behaved reasonably under the contract."' As
noted earlier, that is especially true because it is not always a single
decision to breach, but rather a series of decisions as to how much
precaution to take against the possibility of an inadvertent breach, and
each decision from that series would in principle need to be analyzed for
its efficiency. 9 All of this work is done automatically by expectation
damages, and if they are to be abandoned in favor of reliance, the cost-
benefit decisions will now need to be made consciously.
Nevertheless, the two principles do identify the place where the
concepts of expectation and reliance logically interconnect. What
should be done pragmatically about the administrative difficulty of that
connection is a second question, which can only be answered when we
get clear on what ideal it is we are trying to approximate with practical
working rules. At a pragmatic level, it would seem that Principle 2 is
136. U.C.C. § 2-209 cmt. 2 (1989) ("But such matters as a market shift which
makes performance come to involve a loss may prove such a [good faith] reason [for
modification] even though there is no such unforeseen difficulty as would make out a
legal excuse from performance under Sections 2-615 and 2-616.").
137. This feature of repudiations in insurance contracts (and of other contracts with
insurance features such as product warranties) is stressed in Kelly, supra note 10, at
1776.
138. Even under expectation damages, the judiciary is required to calculate the cost
side of the cost-benefit equation, and it has been argued that the risk of judicial error
there is so great as to call for specific performance of at least some contracts. Bishop.
supra note 88, at 300-02 (distinguishing contracts to give and contracts to do). The
administrative problems are even worse when the judiciary is asked to calculate both the
cost and the benefit side.
139. See supra notes 94-95 and accompanying texL
going to have its main bite at very early stages of a contractual
transaction, shortly after a promisor has discovered that she has made a
terrible mistake. At that point there will not have been too much time
for the promisor to have made inefficient precautionary decisions under
the contract itself. Indeed, if she has just discovered the information
about the mistake, she probably did not make any inefficient
precautionary decisions, as she assumed the contract was rational and
binding and covered by expectation damages.
The principles could be given further flesh at this point, but instead
those refinements will be presented in the context of considering some
of the existing literature on expectation and reliance. It is said that every
law review article has a section in it in which it is pointed out that
everything previously written on the subject was wrong.' ° That is
emphatically not the purpose in discussing the literature below, which is
strikingly rich in quality and clearly anticipates in general form many of
the ideas discussed thus far. Indeed, I regret that I cannot discuss more
articles in depth in the text, although footnote references show that my
debts are broader than those listed below. Space limitations require that
I confine my attention to those authors who most directly address the
normative and economic underpinnings of expectation and reliance, as
opposed to those who are more interested in the existing positive legal
rules or the history of how they have evolved. "' In particular, I want to
address those authors whose ideas are closest in spirit to the conclusions
I have reached here, and try to show in each case how my ideas fit into
the context of theirs.
III. SITUATING THE TWO PRINCIPLES WITHIN THE EXISTING
LITERATURE ON EXPECTATION AND RELIANCE
A. Lon Fuller and William Perdue, Jr.
In a classic two-part law review article, Lon Fuller and William
Perdue, Jr. argued that the reliance interest should play an important role
in contract law, and indeed that it did play an important role although it
140. See generally Kenneth Lasson, Scholarship Amok: Excesses in the Pursuit of
Truth and Tenure, 103 HARV. L. Rav. 926, 928 (1990) (noting that most prior
scholarship is not valuable).
141. For a spirited debate on whether the early common law was dominated by
concern for the expectation or the reliance interest, see Morton J. Horwitz, The
Historical Foundations of Modern Contract Law, 87 HARV. L. REV. 917, 937 (1974)
(explaining that expectation was a latecomer to the law); A.W.B. Simpson, The Horwitz
Thesis and the History of Contracts, 46 U. CHI. L. REv. 533, 542 (1979) (claiming that
Horwitz's alleged differences between eighteenth and nineteenth century English
contract law are largely illusory).
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was largely unrecognized as doing so.'4 2 The article began by calling
into question the centrality of the expectation interest. Expectation was
understood by the law as compensation for harm, but the plaintiff had
been "harmed" only relative to a position she had never occupied."0 The
reliance interest was a more compelling norm,'" and might well serve as
a central organizing principle for contract law as a whole,'" but
expectation damages were actually justifiable in the business setting as
an indirect way of promoting the reliance interest. 5 It is difficult to
prove the ways in which the promisee behaved differently because of the
promise, and if only provable reliance were recoverable this would in
practice tend to discourage reliance. 47 Among the most difficult forms
of reliance to prove are the opportunities foregone because of the
defendant's promise. But often the terms of the actual contract will have
been quite similar to the terms of the contract that would otherwise have
been entered but for the promise, in which case expectation is a very
close proxy for the reliance interest.'0
The difficulty of proving the amount of reliance, and the ability to use
expectation as a proxy for reliance where foregone opportunities are
involved, are crucial insights. Principle 2 requires courts to do as well as
they can to measure reliance, but it does not preclude expectation
damages as an indirect measure of reliance in any case where that is the
best proxy available. However, the idea that expectation is important
only when and to the extent that it is a good proxy for reliance does not
appear to be sound. In Motives 1 through 4 considered before,
142. Fuller & Perdue I, supra note 54, at 53; LL. Fuller & William R. Perdue, Jr..
The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages: 2, 46 YALE LJ. 373, 373 (1937) (hereinafter
Fuller & Perdue I1).
143. Id. at 52-53 (stating that expectation "compensates" plaintiff for something he
never had).
144. Ild. at 54, 56-57 (claiming that restitution, reliance, and expectation interests
are normatively compelling in that order).
145. Id. at 70 ("We might easily base the whole law of contracts on a fundamental
premise that only those promises which have been relied on will be enforced.").
146. ld. at 70 ("As the chief exception to this principle we should have to list the
bilateral business agreement. The rationale for this exception could be found in the fact
that in such agreements reliance is extremely likely to occur and extremely difficult to
prove.").
147. Id. at 60-62.
148. Id. at 62 (noting that expectation is particularly good proxy for reliance in
competitive markets). An excellent analysis of the idea that particular damage interests
can be pursued on the theory that they are proxies for other types of damage is presented
in Avery Katz, Reflections on Fuller and Perdue's The Reliance Interest in Contract
Damages: A Positive Economic Framework, 21 U. Mica. J.L REFont 541, 542 (1988).
expectation is important in its own right, as the promises themselves
were unobjectionable but were followed by opportunistic breaches that
constitute second-decision wrongs.' 9
If an insurance company will not pay after a fire has occurred, the
insurance company may or may not have caused the insured to rely by
foregoing another insurance carrier. I do not wish to quarrel with Fuller
and Perdue's conclusion that the wrong is aggravated if the insurer did
induce the insured to forego other options, especially if it knew the
insured was doing so. But it is emphatically wrong to refuse to complete
the efficient project of risk placement even if the insured was too busy to
have otherwise consulted another carrier. Nor is the insurance
company's behavior rendered rightful if the insured has not actually paid
premiums but has merely made a promise to do so which the insurance
company or the courts are willing to waive.
The central flaw is the assumption that "harm" needs to be assessed
relative to the status quo ante before any dealings between the parties. It
assumes that private parties ought to have no power to shift existing
legal entitlements or baselines, even when the privately chosen baselines
constitute an efficiency improvement on the historic ones." But there is
no basis for the assumption. Where the decision to alter the baseline is
mutually voluntary, rational, and informed, the new baseline should be
assumed to be a superior system of legal rights between the parties to
that which had governed before. Preexisting baselines are typically
variants on the live-and-let-live ideal, which as many people have noted
is frequently ill-suited to a world of interdependence,"' and those
baselines can exist without any direct input from the parties whose legal
rights and duties were involved. Harm relative to rationally and
voluntarily chosen baselines is not a queer form of harm at all."' It is the
harm that the insured suffers when her rational plan for preserving her
financial future is undermined by the insurer's callous offer to restore
the status quo ante before the rational plan had been made.
In the second part of Fuller and Perdue's article, the authors discuss a
number of uses for the reliance interest which already exist in the law,
149. See supra notes 21-49 and accompanying text.
150. Curiously, this is not at all the assumption that Fuller himself made in a
subsequent article. Lon L. Fuller, Consideration and Form, 41 COLUM. L. REv. 799, 808
(1941) (discussing idea of private autonomy).
151. E.g., Jay M. Feinman, The Last Promissory Estoppel Article, 61 FORDHAM L.
REv. 303, 312 (1992) (pointing out the need to shift from neoclassical assumptions to a
legal approach that "emphasizes the interdependence of individuals in social and
economic relationships").
152. The term is taken from Fuller & Perdue I, supra note 54, at 52-53 ("Yet in
this case we 'compensate' the plaintiff by giving him something he never had. This
seems on the face of things a queer kind of 'compensation."').
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sometimes hiding under the rubric of "restitution" when in fact the
benefit received by the defendant was rather fictitious. " These include
cases where certainty concerns exclude expectation damages,,'4 where
expectation would impose an undue burden on the promisor, ' where
performance of the contract has been interfered with by external
circumstances,'6 and where contracts were imperfect in expression or in
legal effect.'5
This portion of Fuller and Perdue's analysis is extremely congenial to
the approach defended here. When a party clearly consented to
undertake an obligation but the contours of that obligation were not
spelled out with much certainty, one option is to try to fill in the contract
with judicial gap-filling rules. At some point, however, one worries that
the duties being judicially implied bear too little resemblance to those
the promisor actually was willing to undertake, and that one might be
unfairly enforcing a much more burdensome contract than the promisor
anticipated. Still, if the promisor clearly intended to make a binding
promise, and the promisee relied, it is appropriate to make the promisor
accountable for that reliance, which was the product of the promisor's
having purported to bind herself to a contract that could not in fact be
justly enforced. And, of course, Fuller and Perdue's "undue burden" and
"external circumstances" examples are core ideas behind Principle I.M
The last example concerned contracts that were imperfect in
expression or in legal effect, which primarily concerns promises within
the statute of frauds that are not evidenced by a writing but upon which
promisees have relied.'59 This problem involves some unrelated issues
about how much judicial deference ought to be paid to legislative
judgments, but it is possible to say something more about this example.
Serious detrimental reliance frequently may be clear and convincing
evidence that some kind of a promise must have been made,WO but in the
153. Fuller & Perdue II, supra note 142, at 394 (stating that "restitution" is often
measured by plaintiff's loss rather than defendant's gain).
154. Rd at 373.
155. ld. at 377.
156. ld. at 379.
157. Id. at 386.
158. See supra notes 120-36 and accompanying text.
159. The trend in the case law appears to be to recognize a promissory estoppel
exception to the statute of frauds only when it would be unconscionable to refuse to
recognize the claim. Phuong N. Pham, The Waning of Promissory Estoppel, 79
CORNELLL. REv. 1263, 1276 (1994) (collecting cases).
160. RESTATmENT, supra note 4, § 139(c) (documenting that one factor in deciding
absence of a writing we may not be too confident about the terms of that
promise (especially given the legislative lack of confidence in the oral
contract reflected in the statute of frauds). As with the certainty
hypothetical, we could fill in the gaps with flimsy evidence of what the
terms might have been, but this raises the prospect of creating a contract
and imposing it unfairly on the promisor. Still, if we are sure that some
purportedly binding promise was indeed made, it may be fair to
reimburse the plaintiff for tangible reliance incurred because the
defendant made a promise that purported to be binding but in fact was
not.
The principal addition made here to the second part of Fuller and
Perdue's famous article is a theoretical story for organizing these various
existing uses of the reliance idea. In that article reliance was presented
as a kind of compromise verdict when expectation seemed too generous
and no damages or mere restitution did not seem generous enough.'6 '
We have offered some structure to these examples, showing that the
reliance interest is not a compromise but a principled response to the tort
of entering into an obligation that purports to be binding but in fact is
not because of the unanticipated burden enforcement would entail.
B. Patrick Atiyah
Professor Atiyah has been a contemporary champion for something
very much like Grant Gilmore's famous "death of contract" thesis.
Atiyah objects to the centrality that modem contract theory gives to the
wholly executory contract, neither performed by either party nor relied
upon.6 6 Existing theory metaphysically reifies the contract as a "thing"
that comes into existence prior to any actions of the parties, other than
the actions of forming the agreement itself"'6 Under this conception,
benefit derived by the promisor and detriment suffered by the promisee
are theoretically irrelevant; what matters is simply the voluntary consent
whether injustice from applying the statute of frauds in the face of reliance requires
enforcement is "the extent to which the action or forbearance corroborates evidence of
the making and terms of the promise, or the making and terms are otherwise established
by clear and convincing evidence").
161. Fuller & Perdue I, supra note 54, at 376-77 (stating in some of the certainty
cases "the reliance interest represents a midway station between no liability and a
complete liability for the expectancy").
162. GILMORE, supra note 3. Atiyah's thesis was given historical grounding in P.S.
ATIYAH, THE RISE AND FALL OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT (1979).
163. Atiyah, supra note 17, at 210 (noting that executory contract lies at very heart
of contract under the classical model).
164. Id. at 197 (stating that the classical model treats a contract as a thing, with an
objective existence prior to any actions of the parties).
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of the promisor to assume an obligation. "
Atiyah finds this picture of contractual obligation objectionable. The
wholly executory contract does not represent a very compelling case for
the use of state power. If there has been no unjust enrichment and no
detrimental reliance, this should not be viewed as a paradigm of
contractual obligation. Perhaps risk allocation concerns may justify the
enforcement of some executory contracts, but Atiyah says that this
consideration is less common than frequently believed.' The pure
promise theory appeals to those who want to reward the skillful and
knowledgeable, but not to those who seek to protect individuals from
their mistakes. For Atiyah, a law that makes benefit and detriment
irrelevant is strange. Is it not obvious that the case for enforcing
someone's promise is greater if that person has received something in
exchange which motivated that promise than if the promise is made "in
the air" with nothing received in exchange? And is it not equally
obvious that the case for enforcing someone's promise is greater if the
promisee would be affirmatively harmed by the activity of making and
then withdrawing the promise, rather than simply disappointed in not
receiving an expected gain?
Indeed, Atiyah looks forward to a law in which benefit and detriment
will assume a more central role and voluntary consent will be less
significant. If we have ordered a meal in a restaurant, we must pay for
the benefit we have received, and there is no need to invent a fictional
promise in which we agreed to pay. Even if the parties have agreed on
the price, that price could be, in this conception, merely evidence of
what the just obligation of the patron is, given what he has received.'
Purely private autonomy over price leads to too much abuse through
unequal bargaining power.' 69 Similarly, we could be liable in some
circumstances for the detrimental reliance others suffer through our
actions without regard to our voluntary consent. While Atiyah does not
165. Id. at 202 (explaining that failure to consider benefit or detriment leads to
"grotesque distortion" of actual normative situation).
166. See id at 216-17 (stating that frequently it is the law's interpretation rather
than the parties' intent that makes a contract an exercise in risk allocation).
167. Id at209.
168. Id at 207-08 (pointing out that actual interest rate is good but not conclusive
evidence of just and reasonable interest rate).
169. Id. at 193-94. My views on the mischief worked by the concept of unequal
bargaining power in the employment context are presented in a previous article.
Christopher T. Wonnell, 77w Influential Atyth of a Generalized Conflict of Interests
Between Labor and Management, 81 GEO. LJ. 39 (1992).
seek to banish the voluntary/involuntary distinction entirely, he aspires
to a more complex theory that would include benefit and detriment and
elevate the importance of those factors relative to the importance of
consent.
170
How does our theory compare with that of Atiyah? An important
point of agreement is that the executory contract is more likely than
contracts which have reached later stages to be breached for Motives 5
and 6 discussed above, which are those concerning surprise, new
information, and regret.' 7' By definition, an executory contract does not
involve taking advantage of the fact that the other party has gone first, as
in Motive 1. Nor does it involve Motive 2 of breaches motivated by
situational monopoly, if the executory contract is defined to include an
absence of reliance as well as performance.
On the other hand, Atiyah does not have a good explanation for a very
common commercial practice. Parties want to think of themselves as
fixing their obligations as of a particular point in time, before and
without regard to actions taken pursuant to the arrangement.' 2 Dates are
set for the "closing" of the deal. People shake hands or exchange
signatures. The contracts themselves often recite the date at which they
become effective. Atiyah's normative views would not be affected by
this practice if the principal explanation were that sophisticated parties
wanted to lock in the unconscionable deals they had managed to
negotiate with the unsophisticated before the latter came to their senses.
But this hardly seems to be the likely explanation for a norm that has
continued for long periods of time, and that includes the largest deals
between corporations backed by teams of lawyers.
Two factors seem to be neglected here. The first is that Motives 3 and
4, risk allocation and the productive use of information, are implicated
by the executory as well as the partially performed contract. Atiyah
minimizes the risk allocation motive, but other commentators have
argued that the motive is involved in most contracts.'73 And it does not
require some perverse normative sympathy for the skillful and
170. Atiyah, supra note 17, at 222-23. Atiyah has actually been criticized for being
overly reluctant to throw out the entire classical model of contract. Betty Mensch,
Freedom of Contract as Ideology, 33 STAN. L. REv. 753, 768-79 (1981) (finding it
"troubling" that Atiyah fears a loss of freedom from completely abandoning contract).
171. See supra notes 50-72 and accompanying text.
172. One indication of this attitude comes from Russell Weintraub's survey of 182
corporate general counsels. He asked whether a party should be able to recover his lost
profits as a result of a contract that was made and immediately broken before any chance
for reliance; 68.3% of the respondents indicated that such profits should be recoverable.
Russell J. Weintraub, A Survey of Contract Practice and Policy, 1992 Wis. L. REv. 1,
29-30.
173. POsNER, supra note 21, at 116 ("Ordinary commercial contracts also shift
risks, and thus provide a form of insurance.").
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knowledgeable to see the benefits that arise from bringing information to
bear on transactions in the Motive 4 settings.
The second explanation for the practice of locking contracts in at
particular times is that the wholly executory contract is not easy to
identify for either the parties or the courts. As Atiyah recognizes, people
often begin to rely on contracts in subtle ways from the moment they are
entered." If one did not really have a "contract" until the other party
had relied, one would have to keep tabs on what actions or omissions the
other party to the contract was taking and what was motivating those
actions. One would also need to know what actions or omissions (by
oneself as well as the other party) a third party court would be able to
discover, and what such a court would probably think was motivating
those actions. This would call for costly information exchanges and
ultimately a lot of guesswork. Additional information and guesswork
would be required if one were to say that the "contract" is binding only
to the extent of reliance as long as that remains provable, but becomes
enforceable to the extent of expectation when reliance has become too
subtle and diffuse to be proven other than by the proxy of expectation.'73
Having said this, Atiyah's core insight-that benefit received and
detriment suffered strengthen the case for enforcing a contract-is
fundamentally correct, because it brings the opportunistic Motives 1 and
2 for breaching a contract into play. And it is objectionable when
contracts, championed by economists for bringing about Pareto efficient
changes for the parties, 76 are used instead as instruments for
redistributing wealth from the gullible to the sophisticated. The best
way to handle this is with a rule that fundamental mistakes will
constitute an affirmative defense, excusing a person from contractual
duties and rendering them liable only for reliance, which at an executory
stage may call for little or no liability. There is no call for abandoning
the fictional metaphysics of a contract as "existing" from a point in time,
any more than we should stop thinking of other boundary-defining and
174. Atiyah, supra note 17, at 212 ("Executory contracts do not normally remain
executory for very long.").
175. Kelly, supra note 10, at 1782 (noting similar error risks with rule that
substantial reliance is needed to justify expectation award).
176. Contracts are not really Pareto efficient in a strict sense, as third parties such as
competitors of the parties can be hurt by legal rules that make the transaction between
these two parties operate smoothly. It remains useful to distinguish between legal rules
that are Pareto efficient relative to the parties themselves and rules that enhance the
wealth of one party to the detriment of the other.
discord-reducing constructs as existing. In this respect, contract
entitlements are like national boundaries fixed by treaty, statutory and
constitutional entitlements, and property titles spelled out by long
descriptions of boundaries. There may be moral reasons for a particular
line, but there are also strong reasons of stability and cost avoidance for
acknowledging the existence of a clear line that does not melt into the
indeterminate mixture of reasons that inspired the entitlement."
Atiyah also looks forward to a jurisprudence in which consent will be
de-emphasized relative to benefit and detriment. '  The courts will
decide what duties people justly owe in light of what they have received
and who has been counting on them; what those people said they would
be committed to is merely evidence of what that just responsibility is.
The striking feature of this vision is the extraordinary confidence it
reflects in the epistemic capacities of state officials who have chosen to
cut themselves off from market signals. Market choices reflect the
personal and concrete information of the people with a direct stake in the
accuracy of their perceptions.7 9 We have forty centuries of experience
with wage and price controls designed to identify the "just price" for
particular goods and services, and it is a horrible experience. Our
point here is not to quarrel with the idea that an interdependent world
may call for background rights and responsibilities in which detrimental
reliance plays a role, but if those rules are not to become
counterproductive burdens they should yield to evidence of actual
consent by the parties affected by those rights and responsibilities.
C. George M. Cohen
In his article The Fault Lines in Contract Damages, Professor Cohen
argues that contractual damages are not in fact, and should not be, as
impervious to fault as people generally assume.' 8' He divides contractual
breaches into three categories: contracts that should not have been made,
contracts that should not be performed, and contracts that should have
been performed."8 He argues that reliance damages are appropriate for
177. Larry Alexander, "With Me, It's All er Nuthin"': Formalism in Law and
Morality, 66 U. CHI. L. REv. 530, 531-51 (1999). The dispute-settling function of
formality of legal entitlements is the theme of this article. Id.
178. See supra notes 168-70 and accompanying text.
179. FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, The Use of Knowledge in Society, in INDIVIDUALISM AND
ECONOMIC ORDER 77, 83-84 (1948).
180. ROBERT L. SCHUETrINGER & EAMONN F. BUTLER, FORTY CENTURIES OF WAGE
AND PRICE CONTROLS: How NOT TO FIGHT INFLATION 3 (1979).
181. Cohen, supra note 45, at 1226.
182. Id. at 1233-34.
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the first two categories while expectation is appropriate for the third.'"
The first two categories in Cohen's scheme correspond to the notion
of "efficient breach." The first category involves a contract that was
inefficient from the beginning, presumably because of some mistake that
at least one party made about the value or cost of performance. The
second category involves a contract that would have been efficient if
circumstances had remained the same, but has become inefficient due to
changes in the cost or the value of performance after the contract was
entered. In these two cases, Cohen notes, we really do not want the
contract to be performed." The contractual bottleneck is essentially a
kind of accident, and we should apply the rule we would apply to other
accidents, of restoring the status quo ante, which is done by reliance
damages." The third category involves a breach that was privately
beneficial to the breaching party but not socially efficient. These
breaches should be met with full expectation damages as a method of
deterring them. Indeed, in principle we could respond to such inefficient
breaches with punitive damages, although for practical reasons he does
not think that would work terribly well.'s'
There is much in Cohen's scheme that is quite congenial to the
approach taken here. The contract that "should not have been breached"
corresponds to the first four motives for contractual breach explored
here, the principal addition being to spell out the types of circumstances
that should constitute this category.' If the breach is occurring because
of nonsimultaneous performances, or to exploit a situational monopoly,
or to escape a risk allocation, or to confiscate information productively
used in the transaction, that breach is indeed a wrong that should be met
with expectation damages. This position agrees that punitive damages
are more attractive in theory than they probably would be in practice.
One serious problem with punitive damages is that these various motives
are not always easy to identify, and punitive awards could lead to
overdeterrence of legitimate behavior that one might fear would be
183. Md at 1246 (noting contracts that should not have been made need reliance
damages); id at 1257-58 (explaining contracts that should not be performed need
reliance damages); id at 1280 (stating contracts that should have been performed need
expectation damages).
184. Id. at 1246, 1257.
185. Id. at 1246 (making this analogy and then relying on the economics of accident
law as set forth in STmvEN SHAvELL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF ACCIDENT LAw 127-28
(1987)).
186. Cohen, supra note 45, at 1314-15.
187. See supra notes 21-49 and accompanying text.
mistaken for one of these four motives.'
A significant disadvantage of Cohen's scheme is that it seems to give
up completely on the pricing benefits of expectation damages.
Expectation damages would not be used as an invisible hand mechanism
for distinguishing between efficient and inefficient breaches without the
court's having to know how costly performance had become. When the
court, using its own information, felt that the breach was an efficient
one, it would assess only reliance damages. If the court was mistaken in
its cost-benefit calculation, an inefficient breach would have been
undersanctioned and similar breaches in the future would be
underdeterred. Mistakes are especially likely once one remembers that it
is not merely the final decision to breach that must be evaluated by the
court for its efficiency but each preparatory decision that rendered it
more or less likely that a party would be able to perform.
Of course any scheme that contemplates reliance damages as a remedy
for nonperformance will suffer from this problem to some degree. After
all, criterion (C) of Principle 2 calls for the court to assess whether the
defendant has behaved "unreasonably" under the contract, which is a
cost-benefit decision made by the court rather than an invisible hand
decision made by the party under a shadow price. But Principle 2 is
brought to bear only for extreme and unreasonable mistakes or changes
in circumstances. In the normal run of cases, expectation damages
would be applied in order to obtain the informational benefits they
provide in Motive 6 cases. In that sense, Cohen's analysis suffers from
the same problem as Atiyah's in deviating from expectation routinely
rather than in exceptional cases.
There is still another problem with Cohen's criteria for distinguishing
between the cases appropriate for reliance and those appropriate for
expectation. For Cohen, the crucial factor is whether there are net social
costs from forcing the parties to complete the unexecuted portions of the
contract.89 If there are no such social costs, the contract should be
enforced with expectation damages regardless of how large the private
loss to one of the parties from the contract should become.
The spirit of the present proposal is different, a difference that focuses
primarily on the Motive 5 cases considered earlier. A contract may
prove to be enormously redistributive without any obvious possibilities
for "efficient breach." For example, in the Dumb/Dumber case, suppose
that the stone has been turned over but has not yet been paid for. It does
not cost society any resources to pay the contract price in cash; the issue
188. Cohen, supra note 45, at 1314-15.
189. Id. at 1313 (noting that expectation damages are common primarily because
litigated breaches tend to be inefficient).
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is purely redistributive. Indeed, even if the stone had not been turned
over there is no obvious inefficiency in requiring this action; there is no
reason to believe the fake is any less valuable in the hands of Dumber
than in those of Dumb. The cost we are seeking to avoid is not (merely)
the cost of additional inefficiencies that would flow from the further
enforcement of unexecuted portions of the contract. It is the cost of
transactions with a redistributive effect that overdeters mistakes by one
party and tempts the other party to search out someone who is mistaken.
The difference is shown most clearly by the commercial practice,
apparently common as judged by the many cases that have arisen, of
one-sided modifications of the contract price made in the face of some
mistake or change in circumstances.'90 If the nonprice terms of the
contract are the same, it is likely that the original contract was still
Kaldor-Hicks efficient, but had become very one-sided when the
mistake or change in circumstances occurred. It might be in the interest
of parties in relational settings, or with a strong interest in their
reputation, not to be seen to ruthlessly exploit every mistake made by
their contracting partners to its maximum possible extent. So the
contract is modified to avoid or reduce the redistribution even though the
performance had not become socially inefficient in a Kaldor-Hicks
sense. As noted earlier, one can anticipate that Principle 2 could have its
largest practical weight as a rule of law in the shadow of which many
modifications would be entered, especially where relationship or
reputational constraints compelling reasonableness were not terribly
strong.191 Cohen's regime would have no counterpart for this, as it sees
contractual "accidents" in terms of the efficiencies saved by refusing to
enforce performances that have become more costly to enforce than they
are beneficial to the other party.'9 '
D. Charles Goetz and Robert Scott
In their article Enforcing Promises: An Examination of the Basis of
Contract, Professors Goetz and Scott present an economic analysis of
190. Cases on the policing of one-sided modifications are collected in
FARNSWORTH, supra note 65, at 276-95.
191. See supra note 136 and accompanying text.
192. Cohen, supra note 45, at 1241 (stating that contractual accidents occur when a
regret contingency has made continued performance under the contract jointly
unprofitable).
the institution of promising.'93 They begin by noting that most law and
economics scholars writing in the area of contracts have concerned
themselves with optimizing the incentive to perform or breach.'94 In
doing so, these commentators have neglected the need to optimize the
initial decision as to whether or not to make a promise in the first
instance.
A promise is an advanced commitment with regard to some intended
transfer or exchange. The promise is made because a transfer can be
more valuable to the promisee if the promisor gave a binding advanced
commitment that the transfer would be made. The promisee could
adjust her own spending and/or business decision-making in the interim
to take account of the confident assurance that the subsequent
performance would be forthcoming, something that would not have been
possible if the other party had simply waited to make the transfer
without any advanced promise. Goetz and Scott refer to the benefit a
promisee derives from being able to adjust her planning in this way as
beneficial reliance, or B.' The problem is that these changes in the
promisee's decisions, which render the transfer more valuable if the
promise is kept, also tend to reduce the welfare of the promisee if the
promise is broken. Goetz and Scott refer to the loss in welfare from the
precontract state as detrimental reliance, or R.'9
The promisor makes her promise with incomplete information. As
that information improves, the promisor may encounter regret
contingencies that will make the transaction involve a loss to her and
that will tempt her to breach.'" The question Goetz and Scott explore is
what damages for such breaches of contract would be optimal from the
perspective of the incentives those rules would give prospective
promisors contemplating whether to make a promise. They eventually
arrive at the following formula: D = R - [p/(1-p)]B, where D is damages
and p is the probability of performance on a scale of 0 (certain breach) to
1 (certain performance).'98
The intuition behind the formula is roughly as follows. The prospect
of high damages for breach will tend to discourage promisors from
making promises, and induce them instead to simply undertake the
property transfer or exchange without advanced commitment. Deterring
193. Goetz & Scott, supra note 20, at 1264-66 (exploration into "which system of
promissory enforcement yields the maximum net social benefits from promise making").
194. Id. at 1265-66.
195. Id. at 1267.
196. Id. at 1269 (noting that detrimental reliance cannot be measured by the
expenditures taken because those expenditures may have generated some utility despite
the breach).
197. Id. at 1273 (discussing the wide range of possible regret contingencies).
198. Id. at 1282.
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promises (or causing those promises to become hyperqualified with
exceptions) is a bad thing when the promise itself would be a good
thing. And the goodness of a promise is a matter of comparing the
benefit from a promise that is made and kept (B) with the harm from a
promise that is made and broken (R), with appropriate discounting for
the probabilities of performance and breach (thus pl(1-p)).'"
Goetz and Scott broke ground in the economic analysis of contract
remedies by discussing the importance of the reliance interest to
economic efficiency. And they found the reliance interest important for
the same reason this Article does: the need to optimize the first of two
contractual decisions, that is, the decision as to whether to enter into a
contract in the first instance. Finally, they stressed the importance of
regret contingencies, which are exactly the situations that this Article has
suggested might call for the implementation of a reliance as opposed to
an expectation standard.
It should be noted that Goetz and Scott's formula is not a
comprehensive analysis of the remedies that should attach for breach of
contract. For one thing, it is tied directly to the idea of regret
contingencies, which arise only in what we have called Motives 5 and 6.
If regret is not present, there is no reason to fear that high damages will
result in deterring the making of promises. Looking at the prospect of
those damages, the promisor would realize at the time of contracting that
she would eventually need to perform that contract rather than breach it.
But this will not deter promising because the promisor would still have
her expected profit on the transaction as a whole, though not the extra
profit that might come from breaching after the other person has
performed. If the only reasons for breach are Motives 1 through 4, then
there is no reason to limit damages in accordance with the formula.
Damages should be set at a level of expectation (or even higher) in order
to deter such unjustified breaches.
Does the Goetz and Scott formula correctly handle breaches in
Motives 5 and 6? One problem with the Goetz and Scott formula, as
with Cohen's approach, is that it seems to give up completely on the
idea of pricing breaches in order to optimize the second decision to
perform or breach. The Goetz and Scott formula can produce very small
damages. They are even smaller than reliance damages, because the
promisor is being rewarded for the fact that her promise might have led
199. Id at 1281 (explaining that beneficial and detrimental reliance are the external
effects of the institution of promising).
to beneficial reliance if the regret contingency had not occurred.
Damages this small will not lead to efficient incentives to perform,2" so
if serious inefficiency in breaching is not to be tolerated, the court will
have to do its own cost-benefit decisions on whether true "regret
contingencies" challenging the efficiency of performance have actually
occurred. The judicial tasks would be very great, requiring assessments
not only as to whether regret contingencies justified an ultimate decision
to breach, but also whether they justified the failure to take earlier
precautions against the prospect of being unable to perform. Principle 2
seeks to retain the pricing benefit of expectation damages for the run of
ordinary cases.
Another issue to consider is whether it is appropriate to complicate the
damage formula with an assessment of beneficial reliance. Beneficial
reliance is an important and still unhappily neglected concept, which
Goetz and Scott were quite right to attempt to bring to the center of
attention. It is, after all, the principal reason for the institution of
promising, the more famous detrimental reliance being merely one of the
regrettable costs of the institution.20' However, the Goetz and Scott
formula has not caught on in the literature on contract remedies,
undoubtedly in part because of the complexity of a formula including
beneficial reliance, detrimental reliance, and performance
probabilities.m Is the complexity necessary?
The Goetz and Scott formula, with its emphasis on both beneficial and
detrimental reliance, is not fundamentally a way of assessing damages
for breach of contract. Rather, the formula is a system for optimally
taxing (or subsidizing) the act of making promises.2" It is only a
coincidence that the tax is assessed at the point of breach. In principle
each promisor could be assessed a tax (or given a subsidy) ex ante based
upon the likelihood of regret contingencies, the size of beneficial
200. Robert Birmingham, Notes on the Reliance Interest, 60 WASH. L. REv. 217,
24, 252, 258 (1985) (making this point in the context of discussing Goetz and Scott's
formula).
201. Goetz & Scott, supra note 20, at 1269.
202. The Goetz and Scott formula has had much more influence on the subsequent
literature that asks when preliminary communications should be interpreted as binding
promises. The idea is that a rational party would want to consider the beneficial reliance
and detrimental reliance brought about by promising as well as the probabilities of
encountering regret contingencies. Richard Craswell, Offer, Acceptance, and Efficient
Reliance, 48 STAN. L. REv. 481, 483-84 (1996); Avery Katz, When Should an Offer
Stick? The Economics of Promissory Estoppel in Preliminary Negotiations, 105 YALE
L.J. 1249, 1268 (1996).
203. The possibility that the formula could lead to a positive result led Professor
Birmingham to argue that the Goetz and Scott formula could produce the "Kafkaesque"
image of a Bureau of Promises to subsidize people to announce their intentions to
transact in advance. Birmingham, supra note 200, at 262.
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reliance if the promise is performed, and the size of detrimental reliance
if the promise is not performed. The Goetz and Scott test is a damage
formula only in the sense that a breach of contract is the place where
officials from the legal system happen to come into contact with the
parties and are in a position to assess optimal taxes.
Even more importantly, the formula does not assess the optimal public
tax on the act of promising. After all, promisors will normally be
privately rewarded with more valuable consideration if they make a
binding promise which entails the prospect of significant beneficial
reliance for the promisee.' Promisees will pay less if forced to assume
the risk of detrimental reliance; on the other hand, promisors will
demand more if forced to assume the risk of regret contingencies. The
Goetz and Scott formula is more a way of understanding the private
terms of a contract than a method of assessing public taxes or damages.
The Goetz and Scott insight can, however, be used to see what kind of
public tax on the act of promising is necessary. Public intervention in
the act of promising is primarily required to prevent a kind of fraud. The
promisor has an incentive to make a promise that looks more binding
than it is.o If she communicates the private information she has about
the probability of her regret contingencies, she will receive less valuable
consideration in exchange for her promise. The law can help by holding
the promisor liable for any costs the promisee suffers as a result of regret
contingencies that should have been communicated but were not, and
this is done by awarding the promisee her detrimental reliance. There is
no need for the law to make any deductions from this damage award
based upon the beneficial reliance from a promise that is made and kept;
it is the prospect of detrimental reliance that the promisor has an
incentive to conceal. The law sanctions the failure to communicate
private information, and the resulting deterrence should lead to the
parties having an incentive to define the contours of the promise and the
resulting consideration in a way that efficiently considers the reliance of
the parties.20
204. Goetz & Scott, supra note 20, at 1284-85. In a wholly gratuitous promise, the
promisor presumably is not looking for direct consideration in exchange, but whatever
charitable impulse led her to seek to make a gift would presumably tend to lead her to
want to make that gift in an efficient form in terms of reliance.
205. This "negligent promissory misrepresentation" idea will be treated in more
detail infra text accompanying notes 238-42.
206. Goetz and Scott discuss the possibility of "precautionary adjustments" by the
promisor, but do not see that the distinctive contribution of a public system of damages is
E. Michael Kelly
In his article The Phantom Reliance Interest in Contract Damages, my
colleague Michael Kelly has proposed to do away with the reliance
interest and embrace the expectation interest as the organizing principle
of contract remedies.20 Citing the example of an insurance company
offering to return premiums, he argues that reliance does a poor job of
handling contracts concerned with the allocation of risks.'03 He suggests
that this is a serious flaw with the reliance interest in that most contracts
perform in part a risk allocation function.2°9 He also expresses doubts
about the definition of the wrong suggested by reliance damages, which
is the making rather than the more intuitive breaking of a promise.
2 1
However, Professor Kelly's principal point in the article was that "the
reliance interest" as administered by the courts frequently bore no
relation to the theoretical ideal of reliance, but served only as an
arbitrary limitation on damages. Courts systematically ignore foregone
opportunities, which are an integral part of a promisee's reliance on a
promise. Without foregone opportunities, one was not promoting
reliance at all but something entirely different, which Professor Kelly
calls the "expenditure measure" of damages."' These are actual out-of-
pocket expenditures incurred on the faith of a promise, and while they
have the advantage of being relatively easy to prove, an award based
upon expenditures alone cannot be justified as promoting either the
expectation or the reliance interest.212 Foregone opportunities are
difficult to measure, but the most practical assumption is often that the
profit one would have made on another transaction is fairly similar to the
profit one was going to make on this transaction, which makes reliance
collapse into expectation.1 3
Furthermore, the law shows its weak commitment to the genuine
reliance interest by its handling of the losing contract. Suppose that a
party has entered into a contract that has proven to be a losing
proposition for her, but nevertheless the other party to the contract
precisely to encourage promisors to make those adjustments by communicating their
private knowledge about their regret contingencies. See Goetz & Scott, supra note 20, at
1278-79.
207. Kelly, supra note 10, at 1758-61.
208. Id. at 1774-76.
209. Id. at 1775-76.
210. Id. at 1801. Professor Kelly had some reservations about this point, however,
which are discussed infra notes 221-22 and accompanying text.
211. Kelly, supra note 10, at 1773 ("[T]he reliance interest in practice boils down to
the expenditure measure.").
212. Id. ("The erosion of the reliance interest creates a rift between the normative
theory of reliance and the measure of damages marching under that banner.").
213. Id. at 1768-72.
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breaches and the question is what the remedy for that breach should be.
The promisee would actually prefer a reliance remedy to an expectation
remedy in this setting, because the reliance remedy restores the status
quo ante before the mistaken contract was made, while expectation only
gives the promisee the benefit of her imprudent bargain. It is precisely
in this case where the law refuses to award reliance damages, allowing
the promisor to deduct from the plaintiff's expenditures any amount the
promisor can prove the promisee would have been unable to recoup had
the contract been fulfilled.214 The courts talk about not wanting to rescue
the promisee from the effects of a rationally placed risk.15 The result is
a hybrid remedy of "reliance limited by expectation" which seems to be
justifiable neither by reliance nor expectation theory.16
Kelly argues that we can safely do without the reliance interest
altogether. He acknowledges that there will be cases where the plaintiff
cannot prove where she would have been if the contract had been
fulfilled, but can prove her out-of-pocket costs incurred in reliance on
the promise.1 7 Kelly argues that a remedy of reimbursement for these
costs can be justified by expectation theory, on the ground that the
promisee probably would not have incurred these expenditures unless
she had judged that the contract would at least have enabled her to break
even and recoup her expenses.1 8 Indeed, one can justify recovery for
precontract expenditures as well on the expectation-based theory that
these expenditures would not have been incurred unless the promisee
rationally judged that the overall venture, including those precontract
expenses, would at least break even.2"9 The presumption of break-even
214. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 4, § 349. The section is entitled "Damages
Based on Reliance Interest" but deducts provable losses from reliance award.
215. E.g., L. Albert & Son v. Armstrong Rubber Co., 178 F.2d 182, 189. 191 (2d
Cir. 1949) (stating that promisor has privilege to reduce reliance damages by proven
loss).
216. Kelly, supra note 10, at 1811-12.
217. Id. at 1812. One such case which awarded reliance damages because
expectation was too difficult to prove with reasonable certainty was Security Stove and
Manufacturing Co. v. American Railway Express Co., 51 S.W.2d 572, 576-77 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1932).
218. Kelly, supra note 10, at 1812 (noting the presumption of zero profit).
219. Id. at 1816-23. It is true that a party would rationally go through with a
contract even if it would not cover precontract expenditures, but if one assumes that not
only the contract but the overall venture was rational, then expected revenues should
cover both pre- and postcontract expenses. Precontract expenses were awarded in Anglia
Television Ltd. v. Reed, 3 All E.R. 690, 691-92 (C.A. 1971) but were denied in Chicago
Coliseum Club v. Dempsey, 265 IM. App. 542, 549-51 (1932).
could be rebutted by the promisor, as under present law, but this would
be understood as trying to bring actual evidence to bear on what the
expectation interest was, rather than the anomalous idea of expectation
as a ceiling on reliance.
Kelly's article is commendably pragmatic. Its target is the reliance
interest and it includes a wide variety of objections to that interest. For
my purposes, however, it seems important to distinguish between the
arguments Kelly directs at the reliance interest as an ideal and the
arguments he directs at "the reliance interest" as it is incorrectly
administered by the courts. Pragmatic objections to the courts' attempts
to measure the reliance interest presumably call for suggestions on
possible pragmatic fixes, but if the reliance interest is not the proper
target in the first place, that is a different matter altogether.
Some of Kelly's arguments are directed at the ideal of the reliance
interest. For example, he suggests that the reliance interest is ill-suited
to handling the problem of risk allocation, a conclusion with which this
Article has agreed through Motive 3. The "losing contract" would be
covered within Motive 3 in any case where the contract was a losing one
because of a rationally placed risk that had come to pass. ° But even if
risk allocation is a part of most contracts, there are many reasons for
breaching a contract other than seeking to escape a rationally placed risk.
Kelly also makes the argument that the reliance interest is
theoretically ill-suited to redressing the fundamental wrong of contract,
which is not the making but the breaking of the promise. This point had
been made from a purely abstract standpoint in an earlier article by W.
David Slawson. 2  Kelly seconds the general point, but adds the
pragmatic worry that advocates could make a plausible case that the
making of a promise was the wrong in certain situations.m This Article
220. The problem of reliance damages in losing contracts as defeating rational risk
allocations is discussed in Robert Childres & Jack Garamella, The Law of Restitution and
the Reliance Interest in Contract, 64 Nw. U. L. REV. 433, 440-41 (1969).
221. Kelly, supra note 10, at 1802 (citing Slawson, supra note 1, at 217-19). In a
fine article, Slawson argues that the proper role for the reliance interest is in cases of
unilateral mistake of fact. Slawson, supra note 1, at 218-19. This Article's conclusions
differ from Slawson's in several respects. First, the category appropriate for reliance is
not limited to mistakes of fact but includes mistakes of law, indefinite and informal
promises, failure to foresee regret contingencies, and other defects of the quality of
consent handled by procedural unconscionability norms. Second, not all cases of
unilateral mistake of fact call for reliance. Where the contract places the risk of a
mistake, or where the information lacking has productively been brought to bear by the
promisee, expectation should be awarded. Third, the pricing benefits of expectation will
remain important for many cases of moderately sized unilateral mistakes, as noted in
Motive 6. Fourth, Slawson does not discuss the need of courts to police the
reasonableness or efficiency of behavior under a contract when moving on requests to
rescind for unilateral mistake.
222. Kelly, supra note 10, at 1803-04 (noting that the malleability of language
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has argued that there are two contractual wrongs. One is the breaking of
a promise, where there is no ground upon which nonperformance of the
promise can be justly excused. The other is carelessly inducing the other
party to believe that one has entered a binding commitment when in fact
one has not. Kelly correctly points out that there is an incompatibility
between reliance and the first wrong, but he offers no reason to suggest
there is any incompatibility between reliance and the second wrong.
The remaining issues concern measurement. Professor Kelly is
correct that a recovery based upon out-of-pocket costs is not necessarily
an attempt to vindicate the reliance interest; it seems sound to presume
that the nonbreaching party would at least have broken even if there is
no evidence one way or the other on the profitability of the contract. As
for measuring the reliance interest, it is certainly true that foregone
opportunities ought to be considered, although they will not exist in all
cases. =3
A more problematic idea is that the expected profit on the existing
transaction should serve as a proxy for the profit the promisee would
have made on the foregone transaction. I agree that this can often be a
sensible way of proving the reliance interest, but it is less sensible in the
types of cases that are covered by Principle 2. That principle
contemplates a reliance recovery in the case of highly material mistakes
made by a particular promisor. The promisee who contracted with the
severely mistaken promisor frequently would not have found another
severely mistaken promisor to contract with if this promise had not been
made.' Other promisors would not have offered terms as favorable to
the promisee.
Part of the spirit of Principle 2, after all, is to remove from the
promisee an incentive to seek out and exploit the mistaken party, except
in Motive 4 settings where information is being productively brought to
bear on the transaction. If the promisee's reliance damages were
measured, by proxy, as the profit the promisee actually received by
contracting with the mistaken party, that policy would be defeated.
affects definition of wrong).
223. There will be cases where the promisee could have pursued both the
promisor's venture and an alternative, so that the promisee has lost volume rather than
merely the difference between two prices. U.C.C. § 2-708(2) (1989) (lost profit
remedy).
224. This will not always be the case. The mistake may have related to an
unforeseeable general development (such as the failure to predict a war or natural
disaster) that might have been made by others in the market as well.
This does leave a difficult question about how to measure foregone
opportunities if expectation is not to serve as a proxy. Ironically, in
some cases one might want to apply Kelly's expenditure measure on the
proxy-based theory that the promisee probably would have entered into
an alternative contract in which she would have incurred similar
expenditures that presumably would have been recouped by performance
of the alternative contract.22 Another idea would be to look to the
market price at the time of contracting as the price that nonmistaken
parties would have demanded under the alternative contract, although it
is certainly true that finding the appropriate market price will not always
be easy.
F. Randy Barnett and Mary Becker
In a jointly authored article, Beyond Reliance: Promissory Estoppel,
Contract Formalities, and Misrepresentation, Professors Barnett and
Becker attempted to bring some conceptual order to the doctrine of
promissory estoppelY.16 Subsequently, both Bamettm and Becker228 have
written individual articles expounding their views on expectation and
reliance.
Two potentially related questions have bedeviled the promissory
estoppel doctrine from the outset. Is this a tort provision designed to
compensate people who have been misled by others to their detriment, or
a contract provision designed to hold people to their promises when
others have relied on them?29 And are damages for promissory estoppel
properly measured by reliance or by expectation? Much of the Barnett
and Becker theory is descriptive. It argues that courts have in fact
overwhelmingly awarded expectation damages when applying
promissory estopg3el, and in that sense have treated section 90 as a
contract doctrine. However, the article also offers a framework for
normative insights pertinent to the subject matter of this Article.
Barnett and Becker argue that promissory estoppel is really two
225. Pettit, supra note 18, at 425 n.31 (arguing that the reliance interest can in this
way justify awarding both pre- and postcontract expenditures).
226. Randy E. Barnett & Mary E. Becker, Beyond Reliance: Promissory Estoppel,
Contract Formalities, and Misrepresentation, 15 HOFSTRA L. REV. 443 (1987).
227. Randy E. Barnett, The Death of Reliance, 46 J. LEGAL EDUC. 518 (1996).
228. Mary E. Becker, Promissory Estoppel Damages, 16 HOFSTRA L. REV. 131
(1987).
229. For an argument that contract-related defenses such as the statute of frauds and
the parol evidence rule should not apply to promissory estoppel, see Michael B. Metzger
& Michael J. Phillips, The Emergence of Promissory Estoppel as an Independent Theory
of Recovery, 35 RUTGERS L. REV. 472, 551 (1983).
230. Barnett & Becker, supra note 226, at 445-46.
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different doctrines masquerading as one!' In the vast majority of its
applications, promissory estoppel is a contract doctrine. That is, it
serves to enforce promises that would otherwise be unenforceable due to
the doctrine of consideration, or some formal doctrine such as the statute
of frauds, the parol evidence rule, or the definiteness requirement.
Expectation damages are the appropriate remedy for the enforcement of
promises, and thus the courts are correct to apply that remedy as
frequently as they do. 
2
However, Barnett and Becker suggest that promissory estoppel also
occasionally serves a tort role.23 Their example is Hoffinan v. Red Owl
Stores, Inc.' Employees of the defendant assured the plaintiff that for a
particular sum of money they would be able to set him up in a store."
At the defendant's urging, the plaintiff sold his bakery, bought a small
grocery story to gain experience and then sold it, obtained an option
on land, and took other steps in reliance. The defendant kept increasing
the amount of money plaintiff was expected to raise, and the
plaintiff eventually backed out and brought suit.- The court awarded
reliance damages under the doctrine of promissory estoppel.'" Barnett
and Becker suggest that the case is essentially filling a gap in tort
law, by providing compensation for "negligent promissory
misrepresentation." ' The defendant carelessly made it appear that the
promise to establish the plaintiff in a store was more reliable than it
really was.
However, they argue that it is fundamentally flawed to regard reliance
as the essence of liability for breach of contract. In fact, there is a
circularity in saying that reasonable reliance is what makes a promise
binding, because the legal status of a promise as binding clearly has
much to do with whether any reliance could be characterized as
"reasonable." ' 9  Instead, Barnett in particular has stressed that what
makes a promise binding is the manifest intention to be legally bound."
231. Id. at 445.
232. See iL at 446.
233. Id. at 489-92.
234. 133 N.W.2d 267 (Wis. 1965).
235. Id. at 268-69.
236. Id. at 269-7 1.
237. Id. at 268-71.
238. Barnett & Becker, supra note 226, at 492.
239. Id. at 446-47.
240. Randy E. Barnett, A Consent Theory of Contract, 86 COLUtM. L. REa. 269, 314
(1986) (noting that reliance has evidentiary value in identifying consent to ba legally
The promisor is bound not because someone chose to rely on her but
because she manifested an intent to vest a new legal entitlement in the
promisee which justified the promisee in relying on that legal
entitlement if she chose to do so.
How does our theory compare with that of Barnett and Becker? The
idea that promissory estoppel might be standing in for two different
theories has a clear resonance with our notion of contract as embodying
two separate wrongs. One is the breaking of a contract (without
justification or excuse), and the other is carelessly making it appear that
one is bound when in fact one is not. Barnett and Becker's "negligent
promissory misrepresentation" is as good a name for the second category
as any.
Barnett and Becker are also correct to stress that "reasonable reliance"
depends upon some prior theory for what kind of action or statement one
can reasonably rely upon. "Reasonable" here must mean more than "not
imprudent"; it is reasonable in the sense of prudent to rely on all kinds of
things continuing as they have in the past without our having a legal
right to insist that they continue. Instead, "reasonable" is a normative
concept-when is it reasonable for us to demand that some part of the
world stay stationary so that one can rely upon it more confidently?
Barnett and Becker answer correctly that we have a right to insist that
our property rights remain stable, so what one must find is some
manifestation by the promisor that she was transferring her property
right or legal entitlement to the promisee.
Is it really necessary that the promisor manifest an intention to be
legally bound by her promise? It might be argued that any "promise" is
an action or statement that one can reasonably rely upon; indeed, that is
almost the working definition of the institution of promising."4 As
Sidney DeLong has noted in an important article, however, there is a
significant role for the promise that is understood not to be legally
binding. 2  The promisee is invited to rely on the statement with the
partial security that comes from the knowledge that the promisor's
business reputation will be diminished if the promise is not kept but that
no legal entitlements are being created by the promise. A promisee can
"reasonably" rely on the nonbinding promise both in the sense of
"prudently" relying and in the sense of the promisor's having a moral
obligation to live up to the promise, but a legal right is not created
bound).
241. A.I. MELDEN, RIGHTS AND PERSONS 46, 46-54 (1977) (stating that a promise is
the underwriting of endeavors by the other party).
242. Sidney W. DeLong, The New Requirement of Enforcement Reliance in
Commercial Promissory Estoppel: Section 90 as Catch-22, 1997 Wis. L. REv. 943, 953-
55.
[VOL. 38: 53, 2001] Two Contractual Wrongs
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
because the promisee understood from the beginning that no such
entitlement was being transferred. In DeLong's terminology, it is not
reliance or even reasonable reliance that promissory estoppel protects,
but "enforcement reliance," the reliance undertaken because of the
promisor's manifestation that the promise would be legally
enforceable.23
Charles Knapp has criticized the Bamett/Becker theory on the ground
that it would exclude many promises which do not clearly manifest
either the intention to be legally bound or the intention not to be legally
bound!" But as long as one accepts that there is a legitimate place for
two institutions (the legally binding promise and the nonlegally binding
promise), the issue becomes one of filling a gap when there have been
no express manifestations about which of the two institutions is being
invoked. There may be circumstantial evidence of the parties' intentions
to invoke legal entitlements, such as the use of formalities, the presence
of consideration or of known reliance too large to be undertaken without
a legal commitment, or the use of the promise as part of an economic
activity.
24 5
Also relevant to gap-filling, though less explored, is the economic
question of when rational parties would want to make a promise that was
not legally binding.2' That seems especially likely when legal
proceedings would entail great cost and uncertainty because the
performance in question turned on variables (such as motives for action)
that could not be easily and accurately conveyed to third party enforcers.
Informal promises that employees will be treated fairly and vill not be
fired except for good cause might be such an example, and may explain
the great hesitancy courts have had in recognizing promissory estoppel
claims in that settingU7 Barnett has probably gone too far in following
Farber and Matheson's earlier suggestion that any promise made as
243. Id. at 947 (contrasting performance reliance and enforcement reliance).
244. Charles L. Knapp, Rescuing Reliance: The Perils of Promissory Estoppel, 49
HASTiNGS L. 1191, 1240-41 (1998) (noting that Barnett would fail to protect much
reasonable reliance)
245. Barnett, supra note 227, at 529 (setting out a proposed Restatement that would
acknowledge evidentiary proxies of intent to be bound).
246. Epstein, supra note 114, at 105-06 (noting that two ways to fill gaps are
evidence of party behavior to show implicit agreement and rational bargain that would
maximize joint gains).
247. DeLong, supra note 242, at 988-93 (discussing cases).
248. Daniel A. Farber & John H. Matheson, Beyond Promissory, Estoppel: Contract
Law and the "Invisible Handshake," 52 U. C. L. REv. 903, 930-31 (1985). More
part of an economic activity should be at least presumptively
enforceable. The conditions for a nonlegal promise-complex facts
difficult to convey accurately and at reasonable cost to a third party,
serious reputational constraints on opportunistic behavior-do not seem
to be terribly rare in economic activity. At least when the promises are
made informally and are lacking in consideration, I do not believe that
Barnett has adequately justified at least a particularly serious
presumption against the interpretation of statements as nonlegally
binding promises.
The largest difference between the Barnett/Becker model and the
present one concerns the use of reliance within a setting where the
promisor did manifest an intention to be legally bound. Expectation is
the correct remedy when such promisors commit breaches of the kind
described in Motives 1 through 4; but when regret, or hardship generated
by surprise, is the principal motive for the breach of a promise that was
intended to be legally binding, there is nothing in Barnett and Becker
that would suggest the appropriateness of shifting to a reliance approach.
Barnett and Becker see Red Owl StoresU9 as a case where the
defendant did not manifest any intention to be legally bound, but should
nevertheless be liable because it made promises which it had reason to
know were less reliable than they appeared. This is a plausible reading
of the case, but not a necessary one. Red Owl is an economic actor that
not only knew Hoffman was making huge reliance decisions but directed
him to do so. When they promised Hoffman that they would set him up
in a store for $18,000 and did not tell him that they were undertaking no
legal commitment to him, a reasonable inference might be that they had
manifested an intention to be legally bound. So why not enforce the
promise against Red Owl? As the court noted, the contours of the
promise were too indefinite.' We could try to fill gaps, but the
resulting contract might be unfairly harsh to Red Owl. So we award
reliance damages as a sanction against Red Owl for negligently
manifesting that it was creating a legally binding obligation when in fact
it was not.
Are Barnett and Becker correct to insist that expectation damages are
the proper remedy for most cases of promissory estoppel? Once it
becomes clear that expectation and reliance both have a role within
contract, there is no reason to treat promissory estoppel as a world apart;
the difference between contract and promissory estoppel is formal
recently, Barnett appears to recognize that the scope of enforceable promises defended
by Farber and Matheson was excessive. See RANDY E. BARNETt, CONTRACTS: CASES
AND DOCTRINE 871-72 (2d ed. 1999) (embracing DeLong's criticisms).
249. Hoffman v. Red Owl Stores, Inc., 133 N.W.2d 267 (Wis. 1965).
250. Id. at 272, 274-75.
[VoL. 38: 53,2001] Two Contractual Wrongs
SAN DIEGO LA RE IMV
superstructure that should yield to substantive policy.'" Nevertheless,
the percentage of cases in which reliance damages are appropriate may
be greater in actions brought under promissory estoppel than in actions
brought under traditional contract by virtue of the fact that promissory
estoppel is often used as a kind of consideration substitute. Once again,
the fundamental issue is the motive for particular contractual breaches.
Consider the classic illustration of the donative promise, the famous
Coudert/Williston debate over Johnny and his uncle that was fought out
during debates on the first Restatement of Contracts."- Uncle is aware
that Johnny is thinking about buying a car, and promises to give Johnny
$1000, whereupon Johnny buys a car for $500. When Uncle refuses to
pay anything, should damages be measured by the $1000 promised or
the $500, which is the most Johnny would be harmed by the act of
making and then withdrawing the promise? The hypothetical is a bit
odd, in that Uncle's promise might be interpreted as "I will pay for your
car up to a value of $1000," which would remove much of the tension
between reliance and expectation. But let us assume that the promise
should properly be interpreted as a commitment to give $ 1000 regardless
of how expensive the car is.
Did Uncle manifest an intention to Johnny that the promise would be
legally binding? The informality and family setting raise doubts about
this, although the fact that Uncle knew Johnny was going to buy a car
and promised a sum certain in money, easily enforceable in law, makes
it possible that Johnny could reasonably have concluded that a legal
commitment was involved. Still, the gratuitous setting of the promise
tells us something about Uncle's probable motive for breach. He is not
taking advantage of nonsimultaneous performances if he is not
bargaining for anything at all in exchange for his promise. Nor does it
appear that he is exploiting a situational monopoly in order to extort a
modification. We are not told why Uncle decided not to honor his
promise, but perhaps he had fallen on hard financial times or had learned
that Johnny was not a very deserving object of charity.2" Reasonable
251. Cohen, supra note 13, at 1288 (noting that the doctrinal labels of "promissory
estopper' and "contract" should yield to policies); Fuller & Perdue I, supra note 54, at
52 (pointing out that "quasi-contract" and "contract" are superstructure and should yield
to policies).
252. Proceedings at Fourth Annual Meeting. 4 A.L.I. PROC.. APPENDIX 95-96
(1926).
253. In civil law countries lacking the doctrine of consideration, a gratuitous
promisor is given defenses such as ingratitude and material adverse change in the
people certainly can differ about this, but we might be sufficiently close
to the borderline about whether the promise ought to be treated as legally
binding in the first place that it does not take much of an excuse to
suggest that forcing Uncle to pay the $1000 would be inappropriate. On
the other hand, Uncle did make it appear to Johnny that Uncle had
placed himself under an obligation to pay that money, and Johnny had
spent $500 in reliance on that appearance, so the case for awarding
reliance damages seems fairly compelling.
It is certainly not true, however, that reliance damages would always
be appropriate under promissory estoppel. Expectation damages are
appropriate whenever the first four motives for breach are present. They
may also be appropriate to provide the pricing information to distinguish
efficient from inefficient breaches in Motive 6 cases, or as a proxy
measure of the reliance interest in cases where reliance is suspected to be
large although difficult to prove. In the Red Owl Stores case, the
defendant seemed to be engaged in Motive 2, demanding a series of one-
sided modifications in the original contract as the plaintiff became more
and more dependent. One would like nothing better than to hold the
defendant to the original promise or its value in damages. Thus, if the
contract had been sufficiently certain, one would want to award
expectation. And that is true even if the case had to be brought under
promissory estoppel rather than contract because Red Owl had not yet
received any consideration from Hoffman in the form of money paid or
promised.
G. Mark Pettit, Jr.
In his article Private Advantage and Public Power, Professor Mark
Pettit, Jr. argues for the reliance interest as an organizing principle of
contract law."" He claims that the burden of proof should be placed on
those who favor a particular exercise of state power, and expectation
damages generally involve a larger coercive exaction than reliance, so
the burden of proof to justify that exaction is on expectation advocates." s
He does not believe that they have met that burden.
Pettit notes that the expectation interest enforces the "extra advantage"
that a promisee was able to obtain from the particular promisor above
and beyond any advantage that alternative promisors would have been
willing to offer." 6 It thus involves public power in the service of private
promisor's economic situation. Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The World of Contract and the
World of Gift, 85 CAL. L. Rgv. 821, 828 (1997).
254. Pettit, supra note 18, at 418.
255. Id. at418.
256. Id. at 418-27.
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advantage, helping promisees extract their pound of flesh from the
mistaken promisor that they would not have been able to receive from
the market as a whole.
Having presented this affirmative case for reliance, he then proceeds
to ask whether expectation advocates have met their burden of justifying
this extra exaction. He first considers Charles Fried's moral argument,
that expectation follows from respect for individual autonomy. ' He
finds the argument wanting. At best, Fried's view justifies a moral duty
to keep the promises one has made rather than a legal obligation. - " And
in any event, as Macneil has argued, the enforcement of promises is not
necessarily respectful of autonomy, going directly against the will of the
individual in the ex post position.29
Pettit then looks at efficiency arguments for expectation and finds
them unconvincing. In particular, Pettit notes the dependence of the
Pareto efficiency argument on the question of the proper baseline of
rights.' The "efficient breach" argument suggests that expectation
damages are required to avoid harming the promisee while benefiting the
promisor, but this notion of "harm" begs the question of the baseline of
rights from which harm is measured.
A central point of agreement between this Article and Pettit concerns
the fundamental case for reliance. It can be unjust to enforce the "extra
advantage" that comes from contracting with a mistaken party on terms
that the rest of the market would have realized were unacceptable. I
have added the efficiency point that enforcing the extra advantage
threatens to cause the informed party to unproductively seek out
mistaken parties, and the uninformed party to become overcautious
about contracting and to use excessive care in the contracting process.
On the other hand, enforcing this "extra advantage" is not always unjust.
In Motive 4 cases, the extra advantage is the return for bringing
information productively to bear upon a transaction and should not be
taken away by the application of reliance principles.
257. Fried argues for the expectation interest on autonomy grounds, since "[o]thers
must respect our capacity as free and rational persons to choose our own good, and that
respect means allowing persons to take responsibility for the good they choose."
CHARLES FRIED, CONTRACT AS PRoMIsE: A THEORY OF COIRMACTUAL OBUGATION 20
(1981).
258. See Pettit, supra note 18, at 429.
259. d. at 430 (citing Ian R. Macneil, Values in Contract: Internal and External. 78
Nw. U. L. REV. 340,358 (1983)).
260. Ild. at 434-35.
Pettit's argument about freedom and personal autonomy also seems to
be overstated. I find once again a remarkable parallelism between
efficiency considerations and deontological norms. Just as efficiency
norms cohere naturally with expectation when the first four motives are
implicated, I would argue that freedom norms also cohere naturally with
expectation when those motives are involved.
The relationship of human freedom to contracting is tied up with the
basic premise of this Article that contracts involve two separate choices.
The question that needs to be answered is whether freedom is advanced
when one gives effect to the expression of will at the time of contracting
but not to the expression of will at the time of breach.26' With regard to
Motives 5 and 6, where the difference between the two expressions of
wills concerns new information available at the time of breach that was
unavailable at the time of contracting, Pettit is correct that it is difficult
to say that freedom is always on the side of contract enforcement.
However, the other motives are an entirely different story.
The ability of an individual to make a commitment that she will
thereafter not act upon opportunistic motives is indeed a fundamental
human freedom.262  Her ability to carry out long-term projects is
dependent upon her ability to make credible promises against her
subsequent opportunistic behavior. The temptation to act on these
motives is much like other temptations that threaten the integrity of the
individual's long-range plan of action, such as succumbing to addictions
or appetites. Ulysses had himself tied to the mast because he knew that
his enduring values would be jeopardized by the types of actions he
would be inclined to take under the influence of the Sirens 6 3 This is
contract at its best: the giving of a law to oneself that one willingly
commits to obey in order to promote the enduring projects that constitute
one's own identity.'
Pettit suggests that the autonomy argument supports only a moral duty
to enforce the promise and not a legal duty. But here again it is
important to distinguish between the two institutions of the legally
binding promise and the nonlegally binding promise. Each of these
institutions nurtures an important human freedom; indeed, they are
largely manifestations of the same freedom to voluntarily place chains
261. Mensch, supra note 170, at 759 ("Freedom logic requires a new formation
process whenever performance is no longer in accord with the will of the parties. Only
security logic can step in to demand enforcement.").
262. I have argued this in the context of employment contracts in Wonnell, supra
note 125, at 133-38.
263. See JON ELSTER, ULYSSES AND THE SIRENS 36-37 (rev. ed. 1984).
264. G.H.L. Fridman, On the Nature of Contract, 17 VAL. U. L. REv. 627, 636
(1983) (noting that reliance is inconsistent with freedom rationale for contract).
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upon motives that conflict with long-term projects. The freedom to
make a nonbinding promise facilitates projects that would be threatened
by opportunistic behavior that would be difficult to document to third
party enforcers. And the freedom to make a binding promise facilitates
projects that would be threatened by opportunistic behavior that is too
substantial to be constrained by reputation alone. The only time when it
cannot be said that personal autonomy is promoted is when the courts try
to enforce a promise that was intended not to be legally binding.
Pettit then challenges the efficiency arguments for expectation
damages. The traditional argument is that expectation damages are
necessary if breaches are to be Pareto efficient for all the parties to the
transaction. Pettit notes that this is true only if one regards the promisee
as suffering harm by losing the hoped-for gain. If harm is measured
by the status quo ante, breaches can be beneficial to the defendant
without being harmful to the plaintiff even if only reliance damages are
paid.
It is tempting simply to repeat the response to the baseline point made
in the earlier discussion of Fuller and Perdue.26 The new baseline
should be the standard of harm, because the baseline reflects the rational
judgment of the parties directly affected by the rights and duties rather
than the historical live-and-let-live background rule that may not be
appropriate in the face of interdependence. In fact, however, Pettit's
argument is somewhat different. His concern is cases of regret that may
lead to an efficient breach, or our Motive 6 category. Thus one is talking
about a set of entitlements that, by virtue of new information, may not
have proven to be efficient, so the specific issue becomes why the
contractual entitlements rather than the status quo ante should be the
baseline for measuring harm even when the new entitlements may not
reflect an efficient use of resources.
There are two questions that need to be asked about Pettit's theory of
baselines and efficient breach. First, is he right that the baseline for
measuring "harm" should be the precontract position in cases of regret?
And second, does his conclusion that expectation is unnecessary for
efficient breach follow from his premise about the baseline? I would
argue that in a pure case of regret, that is, one that is not mixed with
Motive 3 of rational risk allocation, Pettit is correct about the baseline
point, but that his conclusion about efficient breach does not follow.
265. Pettit, supra note 18, at 435.
266. See supra notes 142-52 and accompanying text.
With regard to baselines, it is important to remember that in some
cases the parties specifically wish to allocate the risk of various regret
contingencies, and that a risk averse promisee may be willing to pay for
the constancy of returns in the face of regret contingencies that is
provided by expectation. 267 In a pure case of regret unmixed with this
motive, however, Pettit is correct about the baseline problem. A contract
that reflects significant regret that has not been allocated as a risk may
not be one where the new entitlements deserve to replace the status quo
ante as a measure of entitlement and harm. Indeed, when Principle 2
applies, the courts will not leave plaintiff "unharmed" relative to the
position she would have occupied if the contract had been fulfilled.
Those are cases where the contract cannot be justly enforced by virtue of
its unanticipated harshness, so the promisee has no moral right to have
her position judged against a baseline of an entitlement to exploit that
harshness.
However, it does not follow that courts should abandon expectation in
any case where regret is present. We must remember that from a
Kaldor-Hicks perspective, it is proper to look at the actual cost and
benefit of performance ex post, with the benefit of the new information.
The decision to perform is made at the later time, and there is no reason
to ask whether the decision would have looked Kaldor-Hicks efficient
under the costs and benefits as they appeared in the uninformed ex ante
position. Expectation damages serve as a mechanism for pricing breach
in light of the harm that breach will actually cause ex post. The Kaldor-
Hicks conclusion is independent of baselines. 6' Baselines are
distributive; they tell us how much each party separately gained or lost
relative to some identified "zero" point. Kaldor-Hicks efficiency tells
us that the net of all gains over all losses will be a certain amount greater
if the efficient action is taken at the performance stage.
Thus, to the extent that one is interested in promoting performance
decisions that add to rather than detract from societal wealth, and to the
extent that one is going to rely on a pricing mechanism for identifying
those performance decisions, one will need expectation damages
regardless of the baseline problem. The alternative is to try to do
without a pricing approach to efficient nonperformance and have the
court make the (ex post) cost-benefit judgment itself. That is indeed the
267. POSNER, supra note 21, at 135 (arguing that excusing breaches because they
are efficient could defeat insurance function of contracts).
268. Whether expectation damages are considered a windfall or not, an award of
reliance damages would encourage inefficient breaches. Id. at 135. There is a broader
sense in which Kaldor-Hicks depends upon existing entitlements which determine
willingness to pay, but this macroeconomic sense has no apparent applicability to a
discrete problem of contract doctrine.
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approach taken by Principle 2, but only for cases of exceptionally large
mistakes. If the cost-benefit decision is made correctly, no Kaldor-
Hicks inefficiency will result, although the plaintiff will be "harmed"
relative to a baseline that, as Pettit correctly notes, she did not
necessarily have a right to attain.
H. Richard Craswell
Professor Richard Craswell has written a series of articles discussing
the economics of contract remedies.' In these articles, he discusses the
wide variety of considerations that could go into a design for efficient
contract remedies. For example, we might be interested in the decision
as to whether to perform or breach. For familiar reasons, expectation
damages are the best way to optimize this decision, and also the related
decision on how much precaution to take against the possibility of
inadvertent breach2 0
On the other hand, CrasweU notes, a reasonable argument exists that
we should not be worried about the effect of damage rules on the
decision to perform or breach. If performance would be inefficient, the
argument goes, the parties can always bargain to an efficient result ex
post. 7 One problem is that the transaction costs of such bargaining
might be high because of the bilateral monopoly setting and the
possibility that the parties will bluff each other into stalemate. However,
Craswell observes that there are problems with ex post negotiations that
are independent of the extent of transaction costs at that time.
Suppose that damages were set appreciably below or above the level
of expectation, but that renegotiation of the contract could occur with
relatively low transaction costs. The plaintiff's return from the contract,
including money received as part of the ex post negotiation, would then
go up and down with changes in the defendant's business situation. This
uncertainty in the plaintiff's position would be undesirable if the
plaintiff was risk averse. m In effect, the promisee would have bought a
speculative investment in the promisor's business that there is no reason
to believe she was interested in making. Craswell also observes that it is
not very realistic to imagine ex post negotiations over the level of
269. Craswell, supra notes 95, 106, 202.
270. Craswell, supra note 95, at 646.
271. Id. at 635.
272- Id. at 641-43.
precautions defendant would make; plaintiff would have no way of
knowing the level of precautions in defendant's business that would
produce the optimal number of inadvertent breaches.2"
These arguments are all broadly supportive of expectation damages,
which produce efficient performance behavior without the need for ex
post negotiations. In another article, Craswell observed that expectation
damages could lead to overreliance because they theoretically provide
full insurance against breach and could therefore lead to moral hazard
problems. 74 However, he notes that reliance damages also lead to the
same moral hazard problem. 75 His suggestion is to award the damages
that would have been recovered if the plaintiff had behaved reasonably,
a conclusion embraced in both Principles 1 and 2 above. 76 And as an
incentive to induce the promisor to provide information to the promisee
about the probability of breach, he would limit damages to those the
plaintiff would have suffered if she had behaved reasonably given the
information defendant had disclosed to the plaintiff.
77
Craswell then complicated the picture further in an article entitled
Precontractual Investigation as an Optimal Precaution Problem.278
Here he looked at the incentive that contracting parties have to exercise
care at the time of contracting. He said that one is tempted to conclude
that reliance damages would be the way of optimizing this care, because
reliance is the harm caused when a person carelessly enters into a
contract that causes the other party to act to her detriment. However,
this is not correct; reliance damages are too small and would lead to
insufficient care.279 The reason is that a party who fails to conduct a
precontract test ought to be forced to internalize all of the expected costs
of that decision. The costs are indeed the promisee's reliance if the test
would have led the promisor to refrain from contracting, but what if the
test would have led her to contract and in fact she did not? In that case,
the person who failed to conduct the test will fail to confer an external
benefit on another party, namely, the other party's portion of the
contractual surplus from the contract that should have taken place but
273. Id. at 647-48 (noting that there is nothing new to bargain over ex post when
the issue is precautions rather than new opportunity for intentional breach).
274. Craswell, supra note 106, at 376 (discussing expectation as full insurance
scheme).
275. Id. at 376-77 (stating that the reliance measure makes reliance expenditures a
risk-free investment).
276. Id. at 365-66.
277. Id. at 377 (arguing that this remedy would actually be easier to administer than
one requiring assessment of efficient reliance from court's own knowledge).
278. Richard Craswell, Precontractual Investigation as an Optimal Precaution
Problem, 17 J. LEGAL STUD. 401 (1988).
279. Id. at410-13.
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did not. Therefore, we can optimize the precaution decision only with
damages that are higher than reliance in an amount reflecting this other
external benefit that could have been provided by the precontract testing
that was not done by the careless promisor.2'
This story seems gratuitously complex. There is always a small
externality involved in the decision as to whether to contract. If my
choice is between leisure and working for an employer, I get one
hundred percent of the benefit from leisure but must share with my
employer (and perhaps others in direct or indirect privity with my
employer) the extra profit made possible by working. No one has
suggested that we therefore need to force people to work, or subsidize
them beyond their contractual wages in order to bribe them to work. If
anything, the law probably makes this problem worse by subsidizing
leisure through welfare and taxing the income from working. The
concept of trying to correct for these imperfections is administratively
hopeless; one imagines a Bureau to Subsidize Transacting with Others
(or perhaps a tort of unreasonably failing to contract?) that attempted to
measure the external advantage of every possible time we could do
business in tandem with others rather than alone.
When Principle 2 applies, Party A carelessly enters into a contract
with Party B that is too unexpectedly harsh on A to enforce in full, but B
has detrimentally relied on A's apparently binding commitment.
Reliance damages are the actual harm that A's carelessness has caused to
B. One can imagine some hypothetical Party C who was failing to do
the same kind of precontractual inquiry as Party A, but in a situation
280. Id. at 426 ("The optimal measure in such a market will therefore always
exceed the reliance measure, although it could be either greater or less than the
expectation measure."). In a recent article, Craswell argued that there were so many
variables relevant to the economic efficiency of contractual behavior that Fuller and
Perdue's concepts of expectation, reliance, and restitution were no longer helpful.
Richard Craswell, Against Fuller and Perdue, 67 U. CHI. L. REv. 99, 107-11 (2000).
On the other hand, he still maintained that expectation describes roughly the normal
remedy sought by parties, with particular variables calling for remedies above or below
expectation. Id. at 157. Noting this complexity can be useful if the issue is whether to
defer to the parties when they set remedies which appear to deviate from reliance or
expectation. But if the issue is judicially set default rules, this approach seems overly
despairing, for courts cannot realistically set damages which optimize vast numbers of
variables. In any event, Craswell's article contains nothing in the way of variables to
consider beyond those discussed in his previous articles, and the two principles here are
designed to deal in as practical a way as possible with issues of optimal precautions.
optimal breaches, optimal care in contracting, optimal promisee reliance, and optimal
contractual risk allocation. See id. at 109-10.
where the inquiry would have produced the opposite conclusion, that a
contract which otherwise seemed unwise really was advantageous. One
can then imagine that Party C's failure to test meant that C did not enter
into a mutually beneficial contract with some Party D, and that D
thereby lost its share of the contractual surplus. But it is quite the
curious idea to force A to compensate B not only for the harm that A did
to B by contracting but also for the harm that C did to D by not
contracting. This approach seems completely opposed to the idea of
working individual justice between the parties. And the suggested
remedy, which is more than reliance by an amount that we cannot
calculate but bears no relationship at all to expectation, is similarly
without precedent.
This complexity is not necessary. If the promisor is accountable for
the harm she actually caused, her remaining imperfect incentive to
conduct precontract testing will be no greater than the imperfect and
pragmatically uncorrectable incentive not to contract enough that already
exists for everyone. With this revision, Craswell seems broadly
supportive of the view that reliance damages optimize the decision on
whether to enter contracts while expectation damages optimize the
decision on whether to breach those contracts. He does not, however,
offer any method such as the principles defended here by which one
could reconcile the two perspectives into a single set of damage rules
that could optimize the two sets of behaviors simultaneously. Nor does
he offer a moral account of the nature of the wrongs which correspond to
the efficiency conclusions.
One final point should be made about Craswell's position on
expectation damages. He notes that damages which deviate from
expectation mean that the plaintiffs return under the contract will vary
with the fortunes of the defendant's business. In effect, the promisee has
invested in the business of the promisor, something that a risk averse
promisee may not have wanted to do.28' The promisee's investment is
potentially unlimited on the upside in her ability to share in the new
efficiencies from nonperformance, while on the downside the promisee's
losses are cabined by the expectation guarantee. Craswell's insight that
non-expectation damages constitute a peculiar kind of investment
suggests other inefficiencies that they would produce, even if the
promisee was risk neutral.
Suppose that the opportunity for an efficient nonperformance does not
simply jump into the promisor's lap but must be discovered by a costly
inquiry. Or suppose that the defendant needs to consider a risky
281. Craswell, supra note 95, at 644 (stating that remedies for breach should seek to
unbundle the investment in the defendant's business from the sales contract).
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investment that, depending on how it comes out, may lead to either a
highly efficient breach or a highly inefficient breach. The plaintiff's
ownership stake will distort these decisions by the defendant. The
defendant will not have a full incentive to conduct costly searches
because she will have to pay for those searches herself while being
forced to share with the promisee the resulti.n benefits of discovering
the opportunity for efficient nonperformance. ' And the defendant will
have an excessive incentive to avoid the risky investment, because the
plaintiff's investment stake will give her a percentage of the upside risk
while the expectation guarantee means that the defendant bears the
downside risk alone.
IV. CONCLUSION: A STRUCTURE FOR FUTURE DEBATES
ON EXPECTATION AND RELIANCE
If the analysis of this Article is accepted as substantially valid, is the
debate about the role of expectation and reliance over? The answer is
that it certainly is not over. What we have identified here is not a
detailed blueprint for the precise place of expectation and reliance but a
logical structure of those ideals within which future debates can be
productively structured.
The expectation interest is appropriate when dealing with the first four
motives for breach.' Numerous issues remain in fleshing out the
appropriate implementation of this ideal. The first two motives
(nonsimultaneous performances and situational monopolies) seem
simple in concept, but in actual practice they can be quite difficult to
identify properly. It may not be clear whether a construction contract in
which progress payments have been made for portions of the work
nevertheless involves one party's having rendered a larger percentage of
its performance as of a particular point in time than the other. And these
purely opportunistic motives may in fact be part of mixed motives that
involve both exploitation of situational advantages and some degree of
regret or mistake. The third motive of risk allocation is an especially
significant subject for future inquiry; some consensus must be identified
on how broadly it is appropriate to interpret the implicit risks that are
282. E. Allan Farnsworth, Your Loss or Afy Gain? The Dilemma of the
Disgorgement Principle in Breach of Contract, 94 YALE LJ. 1339. 1347 (1985) (noting
problem when efficient breach opportunity is joint product of defendant's breach and his
skill and industry).
283. See supra notes 21-49 and accompanying text.
being assumed by a contract. As to the fourth motive, we have only
begun to understand that transacting with the uninformed can be a
productive activity in some settings and a purely redistributive or
exploitative one in others; further work in distinguishing the two should
be a high priority for research.
The proper role of reliance is to remedy the wrong of carelessly
making it appear that one is contractually bound when in fact one is not.
Again, however, this logical place for reliance does not end the debate
but provides structure for its continuance. Tort scholars are likely to
have the most to contribute here, as the precise mental state required for
the wrong is refined. Must it be shown that the promisor could readily
have foreseen the regret contingency that occurred, so that the failure to
provide for it in the contract constitutes a failure to take steps the court
knows to be cost-justified? Or can one say it is sufficient that, as
between the two parties, the promisor had a more realistic chance of
foreseeing and providing for the contingency that arose than the
promisee?' Either approach could be argued to be a faithful
interpretation of the basic principle; the former requires proof of
negligence while the latter permits negligence to be an inference drawn
in the face of limited judicial knowledge and differential party access to
the information.
Finally, debates need to take place about the proper point for one to
abandon the pricing benefits of expectation damages and go to a judicial
finding of reasonableness under the contract instead. One certainly
abandons the pricing benefits with great reluctance, given the enormity
of the judicial task of actually assessing the efficiency of precautionary
and performance decisions undertaken. However, at some point the
problem of unfair surprise dominates the inquiry, and one needs reliance
damages precisely to provide the price of the promisor's carelessness.
Here the future work necessarily will take on a highly pragmatic bent,
and will require commentary from persons having close familiarity with
the kinds of facts that are more and less realistically to be considered
within the competence of judges and juries.
With all the uncertainty and work that remains to be done, however,
there is reason to be confident that the fundamental nature of the
expectation versus reliance debate is becoming understood. The "death
284. The debate is a familiar one in the economics of tort law, with Posner taking
the view that the court should directly evaluate the costs and benefits of allegedly
negligent conduct while Calabresi and Hirschoff argue that the court should merely
identify which party is in a better position to make the cost-benefit decision. Compare
Richard A. Posner, A Theory of Negligence, I J. LEGAL STUD. 29, 29 (1972) with Guido
Calabresi & Jon T. Hirschoff, Toward a Test for Strict Liability in Torts, 81 YALE L.J.
1055, 1060-76 (1972).
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of contracf' thesis which posited that expectation-based contract theory
was going to melt down into a purely reliance-oriented promissory
estoppel tort is quite clearly wrong."s The ability of parties to set
entitlements by mutual consent and bind themselves not to act
opportunistically in seeking to bring about those expected entitlements
serves both individual freedom and economic utility. By the same
token, one cannot agree with Professor Barnett that we should look
forward to the "death of reliance" as long as the impulse exists to excuse
persons from highly material mistakes in contracting while
simultaneously rendering them accountable for the costs of their own
negligence.2 In short, we are becoming increasingly confident in
asserting that both expectation and reliance have a permanent role within
the normative world of contract. And more than this, we are becoming
confident that we understand the broad outlines of why those doctrines
have their place as remedial counterparts to the two different contractual
wrongs.
285. Robert A. Hillman, The Crisis in Modern Contract Theory, 67 TEX. L REV.
103, 114-18 (1988) (explaining that Gilmore's death of contract thesis postulated that
individualism was doomed, while contract law needs both individualist and
communitarian roots); Richard E. Speidel, An Essay on the Reported Death and
Continued Vitality of Contract, 27 STAN. L. REv. 1161, 1161-62 (1975) (critiquing
Gilmore's "contorts" idea).
286. Barett, supra note 227, at 520-26 (discussing the emerging consensus that
reliance is not central to contract theory). One indication that reliance is not dying is
provided by the attempts by recent drafting committees to bring reliance more explicitly
into the law of sales. These efforts are described and criticized in Michael T. Gibson,
Reliance Damages in the Lanv of Sales Under Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial
Code, 29 ARIZ. ST. L.L 909,996-97 (1997).
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